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ABSTRACT 
This thesis offers a syncretic, synoptic account of Palamedes from the Trojan 
War. It delineates three interpretive modes: (1) that Palamedes was present all along; (2) 
that later poets inserted him into the Trojan narrative, either as an archetypal intellectual 
figure, or as Odysseus’s double; (3) that Palamedes was present only as Odysseus’s 
imaginary Doppelgänger. The thesis accounts for Palamedes’s scarce attention in 
classical texts by way of Lacanian and—via Otto Rank—Freudian psychoanalytic theory, 
as well as by Slavoj Žižek’s adoption of the “vanishing mediator.” After tracing a 
potential textual genealogy from Palamedes to Malory’s Palomydes, the thesis concludes 
with a reading of Palamedes’s implied presence in Inferno 26. 
INDEX WORDS: Palamedes, Odysseus, Trojan War, Doppelgänger, Double, Palomydes, 
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Introduction 
Who is Palamedes? This question, or some unprintable version thereof, first 
escaped my mouth several years ago when, on some Virgilian tangent, I initially 
stumbled upon the name. I soon asked nearly everyone I knew—friends, classics 
students, former professors—and the response was always the same: “Who . . . is 
Palamedes?!” This ignorance is ours but not the blame. We are not supposed to know 
about Palamedes. To know about Palamedes is potentially to undermine much of what we 
think we know about Odysseus. The problem is simply that Palamedes does not exist, at 
least not in the way one typically thinks of others as existing. 
Jorge Luis Borges, referring to Robert Louis Stevenson’s observation that “a 
book’s characters are only strings of words,” applies the same reduction to the “powerful 
men who ruled the earth, as well: Alexander is one string of words, Attila another. We 
should say of Ugolino that he is a verbal texture consisting of about thirty tercets” (279). 
Two factors complicate such a reading of Palamedes. First, the Trojan War possesses a 
unique double valence insofar as it was arguably either Greece’s last mythological event 
or its first historical one. Precariously poised between these two modes of discourse, the 
war enjoys an overlapping of hermeneutic matrices, and it is within this liminal space that 
much of this study resides. For those who hold that Odysseus is himself a fiction, this 
investigation will doubtless appear as preposterous as one devoted to debunking Donner, 
while sparing Blitzen. I am hardly the first to maintain that Palamedes is an 
institutionalized artifice. I aim only to seek out the parameters of this character, accepting 
from the outset that he may be an afterthought to the stories in which later poets have 
inserted him. 
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The second complicating factor is that there is no text of Palamedes. Rather, he 
appears in scattered (and often contradictory) fragments throughout various texts. Writing 
on James Joyce’s enigmatic man in the macintosh, Frank Kermode asks, “Why, in fact, 
does it require a more strenuous effort to believe that a narrative lacks coherence than to 
believe that somehow, if we could only find out, it doesn’t?” (111).1 We may well ask of 
Palamedes, as Leopold Bloom asks of the man in the macintosh, “Where the deuce did he 
pop out of?” (6.826). Kermode is interrogating the expectation of coherence within a 
unified text, whereas the textual Palamedes is necessarily a composite culled from 
various sources. Nevertheless, I must acknowledge the possibility from the outset that the 
riddle is insoluble—to borrow Oscar Wilde’s phrase, “a Sphinx without a secret” (218). 
The following study is therefore a syncretic, speculative account of Palamedes. I have 
gathered these disparate fragments into as cohesive a narrative as possible, indicating 
divergences when appropriate. The speculative portion of the argument concerns those 
grey areas which depend upon which interpretive mode (or combination thereof) one 
uses. 
Although I have conflated these various narratives at times, one should be careful 
throughout not to treat classical writings as one textual monolith. “To create space for a 
different explanation,” Hans Blumenberg writes, “we must free ourselves from an 
illusion of temporal perspective” (Work 151). This would be an apt motto for the 
ahistorical scope of some of my following claims; however, it is also important not to 
                                                 
1
 I would like to acknowledge Dr. Paul Schmidt for his suggestion that I revisit 
Kermode’s reading of Joyce with regard to Palamedes. 
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collapse the textual chronology so completely as to ignore outright the significance of the 
time elapsed between writings. For example, although Homer and Philostratus may sound 
equally ancient to our modern ears, their historical and cultural contexts differ 
considerably. Blumenberg imagines even Homer as “full of anxiety,” writing in “what 
must already have been a moment of fatigue, in that age of incubation . . . to write down, 
and thus to finalize, the ancient inheritance . . .” (Work 152). We would therefore do well 
to bear in mind, throughout the following investigation of priority and doubling, that 
there is a sense in which this material was as ancient to Homer as it now is to us, and that 
even Homer, though first, had his precursors to wrestle. 
Palamedes is grossly overlooked in classical writings, in no small part due to his 
complete absence from Homer’s works, an omission which I shall address shortly. The 
Cypria briefly mentions him. Plato’s Apology contains a passing reference as Socrates 
muses on a hypothetical meeting in the hereafter with “Palamedes or Ajax . . . or any 
other men of old who lost their lives through an unjust judgment” (41B). Virgil is no less 
vague in the Aeneid, when Sinon attempts to insinuate himself, and the wooden horse, 
among the Trojans by referring to the Greeks’ murder of Palamedes (2.82). However, 
most accounts of Palamedes do not appear until the first century AD. 
Following an overview of Palamedes’s history with Odysseus, I shall outline three 
interpretive modes—ways to account for his presence within the narrative—and the 
various etymologies of Palamedes’s and Odysseus’s names which support these modes. 
At this point, the investigation itself will double as I perform a kind of repetition-in-
difference, revisiting the events of Odysseus’s career, but without Palamedes present. 
Psychoanalytic theory will provide the dominant critical paradigm throughout this 
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discussion, specifically Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage, Otto Rank’s work on the 
Doppelgänger, and Slavoj Žižek’s adoption of the “vanishing mediator.” Finally, after 
tracing a potential textual genealogy from Palamedes to Sir Thomas Malory’s Palomydes, 
I shall discuss Palamedes’s potential encryption in Dante’s Ulysses (i.e., Odysseus). 
Plato’s Phaedrus provides one final preliminary example which will serve as our 
point of departure:  
SOCRATES. Then you have heard only of the treatises on rhetoric by 
Nestor and Odysseus, which they wrote when they had nothing to do 
at Troy, and you have not heard of that by Palamedes? 
PHAEDRUS: Nor of Nestor’s either, unless you are disguising Gorgias 
under the name of Nestor and Thrasymachus or Theodorus under that 
of Odysseus. 
SOCRATES. Perhaps I am. However, never mind them. . . . (261B-C) 
Socrates goes on to refer to “the Eleatic Palamedes (Zeno)”; however, this parenthetical 
appositive hardly mitigates the cryptic tone of his earlier remark—namely, that Phaedrus 
has unwittingly heard of Palamedes by an alias. Just as Socrates enigmatically alludes to 
disguising one man under the name of another, so the present interrogation of 
Palamedes’s mysterious identity begins under the aegis of Socrates’s remark. 
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The Hawk, the Handsaw 
Of dubious origins, Palamedes crops up like Cain’s wife in Genesis, seemingly ex 
nihilo. His geographical origins are as obscure as his genealogy. As E. D. Phillips notes, 
“[h]is very location in the heroic world is uncertain; sometimes he belongs to Locris, 
sometimes to Euboea, while the mountain Palamidi above Nauplia shows an old 
connection with the Argolid” (267). Palamedes first appears at Ithaca as part of the Greek 
entourage gathering troops. There he finds Odysseus, who appears to be feigning 
madness to avoid accompanying them to Troy. To this end, he has donned a madman’s 
felt cap, yoked a horse to a bull, and begun salting his fields (Fab. 95). Palamedes alone 
suspects fraud, and he reasons that only a true madman would allow the death of his son. 
Apollodorus, writing in the second century BC, claims that Palamedes reveals 
Odysseus’s sanity by threatening the infant Telemachus with a sword (Epit. 3.7). A few 
centuries later, Hyginus tells an alternative version in which Palamedes places the boy in 
front of the plow (Fab. 95). 
“Don’t forget that he was a war-dodger,” James Joyce once remarked on 
Odysseus. “He might never have taken up arms and gone to Troy, but the Greek 
recruiting sergeant was too clever for him” (16).2 Although one can perhaps understand 
Odysseus’s reluctance to sail off to war over his wife’s cousin, the oath of Tyndareus, 
Helen’s father, stipulated that all of Helen’s suitors would defend her marriage by 
whatever means necessary. However, the oath was Odysseus’s own idea. He devised and 
                                                 
2
 I would like to acknowledge W. B. Stanford’s The Ulysses Theme for recalling my 
attention to Joyce’s remarks, quoted here and elsewhere. 
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offered it to Tyndareus, not as a circumspect means of winning Helen’s favor but of 
securing Penelope, Helen’s cousin, as his bride (Lib. 3.10.9). What does he now care if 
this Helen has run off elsewhere? Of course, the oath which brings Penelope to him is the 
same which bears him away from her. 
Odysseus’s reticence to leave may also have been a reaction to Halitherses’s 
prophecy that, were he to go, it would take twenty years for him to return (Od. 2.161-76). 
Another prophecy was that he would die at the hand of his own son, which he takes to 
mean Telemachus, the “far-away fighter,” whom Odysseus understandably would not 
want to age twenty years more into a man unless under the cheer and comfort of his 
vigilant, paternal eye. How is Odysseus to know that the true murderous son, Telegonus, 
the “far-away born,” is yet unborn and could in fact only be born by Odysseus’s leaving 
Ithaca? Odysseus begets him by Calypso (or, some say, Circe), Telegonus hears of his 
legendary father years later, seeks him out and, scattering a herd of cattle upon his arrival 
in Ithaca, slays the sought-for stranger, Odysseus, who is only defending his herd and 
land (Fab. 127). Were Odysseus never to have left Ithaca in the first place, there could be 
no legendary exploits in the name of which his bastard son could seek him out. Of course, 
one could argue that, were Odysseus to stay at home, Telegonus would never be born in 
the first place. 
The question is why Odysseus would have Palamedes killed for later suggesting 
that the Greeks return home, where Odysseus had wanted to remain in the first place. 
Sources vary as to whether Palamedes made the suggestion at all. Virgil states that 
Palamedes was murdered “quia bella vetabat [because he forbade the war]” (Aen. 2.84). 
Veto—from vetāre, which Virgil uses above—was “the word by which the Roman 
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tribunes of the people opposed measures of the Senate or actions of the magistrates,” 
providing some gravity to Palamedes’s objection (“Veto”). However, as these words are 
part of Sinon’s duplicitous speech to the Trojans, their veracity is questionable.3 Surely 
Odysseus could convince his fellow men to go along with Palamedes’s suggestion. It is, 
after all, Odysseus who first convinces them of the need to defend Menelaus’s marriage 
to Helen, as it is Odysseus who would soon convince his men to award Achilles’s arms to 
him and not to Ajax. Why, then? Perhaps Odysseus resents not his being lured away from 
home but his having been outwitted. Nevertheless, for Odysseus to have to endure such a 
suggestion to return home from the very man who had made him leave in the first place 
would be to add insult to injury and would doubtlessly have aggravated Odysseus’s 
desire for revenge. 
 
Outing Achilles 
 Rather than take immediate revenge on Palamedes, Odysseus finds a surrogate in 
Achilles. The entourage recalls a prophecy made by Calchas when Achilles was but nine 
years old: Troy will not be taken without Achilles. Interpreting this as indicative of 
Achilles’s indispensability to their cause, Odysseus and his men go forth to muster him. 
Achilles’s mother, Thetis, lights on a syntactical nuance in Calchas’s prophecy—that 
Troy would not be taken (sacked) without Achilles’s being taken (killed). It had been at 
Thetis’s wedding that Eris had thrown the apple of discord with its inscription, “For the 
                                                 
3
 For example, Virgil’s Sinon also claims that Belus is Palamedes’s father, whereas most 
writers posit Nauplius (Aen. 2.82). 
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fairest,” thereby setting in motion the events which would lead to the Trojan War. She 
had already taken pains to make her son immortal—with the inadvertent exception of the 
heel by which she had held his infant body while immersing him in the River Styx, 
according to later tradition. Thetis is not about to lose that son, especially in a war the 
origins of which concern an apple so audacious as to imply by its inscription that she is 
not, in fact, the fairest on her own wedding day. She therefore sends Achilles off to King 
Lycomedes’s court at Scyros. She further induces her son to dress as a girl (Lib. 3.13.8). 
 Perhaps the will to seek revenge on a substitute drives Odysseus, the affront of 
having been outwitted by Palamedes still so fresh, to his mark, Achilles. Perhaps it is the 
prophecy that to leave without Achilles would be to undertake a fool’s errand. In either 
case, Odysseus dons the merchant’s disguise and lays out the bait, weapons mixed in with 
the more feminine ornaments. He then cues the trumpet blast and watches Achilles take 
up the arms and spring into action, thus revealing himself as a warrior (Met. 13-162-66; 
Fab. 96). Exposed by Odysseus, Achilles joins the campaign to Troy, leaving behind his 
grief-stricken paramour, Deidamia, and their son, Neoptolemus (Achill. 1.874-88). 
 
Losing the Battle . . . 
As Odysseus sterilizes his land, so does Achilles symbolically castrate himself by 
disguising himself as a girl at his mother’s urging. Thetis is herself no stranger to 
emasculation, having inadvertently eaten of Pelops’s genitals at Tantalus’s banquet. The 
significance of Odysseus’s salting his land, however, is no small matter. There is a 
classical emphasis on the house which John Jones notes: “‘House’ (the Greek oikos and 
its synonyms) is at once house and household, building and family, land and chattels, 
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slaves and domestic animals, hearth and ancestral grave: a psycho-physical community of 
the living and the dead and the unborn” (83-84). Odysseus’s salting of his land is 
therefore significant in both practical and symbolic terms. 
Among the latter I would include the symbolic self-castration implied by 
Odysseus’s act. John T. Irwin, in his work on doubling, illuminates the Freudian 
psychology underlying such behavior: “The son, in the primal act of repression, 
psychologically castrates himself rather than be physically castrated by the father; he 
actively renders himself passive rather than passively submit to being rendered passive by 
another” (91). We should note that this incident already casts Odysseus in the subordinate 
role of the son, with Palamedes as the father. When Palamedes brandishes the sword 
toward Telemachus, he symbolically usurps Odysseus’s paternal castration threat. As 
Irwin notes, “the son’s renunciation of the phallus amounts to a kind of amputation in 
which a part is given up to save the whole” (89). Odysseus would rather feign madness 
and ruin his very livelihood at home than risk his life by joining the men at war. He 
would desecrate his home not to leave it. 
 Agamemnon, in contrast, must deal a mortal blow to his home life precisely so 
that he may take leave of it. At Aulis, he kills a deer and boasts that Artemis herself could 
not have made a better shot. The goddess then causes unfavorable winds to detain the 
fleet until, as Calchas verifies, she has been appeased by the sacrifice of one of 
Agamemnon’s daughters—Iphigenia, the fairest, as with the inscription on the apple of 
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discord at Thetis’s wedding which originally set the war in motion.4 Odysseus convinces 
Clytaemnestra to release her daughter to him by promising that the girl will be wed to 
Achilles (Epit. 3.21-22). Here may be a latent sense of Calchas’s prophecy—without the 
promised hand of Achilles, the Greeks could not procure Iphigenia, and they would have 
remained docked at Aulis indefinitely, unable to take Troy. Agamemnon’s sacrifice of his 
daughter, literally a “making holy,” has as its complement Odysseus’s desecration of the 
oikos. The Greeks sustain each of these losses before having even set sail for the war. 
 
Rivals, or Odysseus Can’t Catch a Break 
 After the initial meeting at Ithaca, there follows a catalogue of one-upmanship in 
which Palamedes bests Odysseus at every opportunity and to the point of disgrace. When 
Odysseus suggests that the Greeks should hunt the wolves for sustenance, Palamedes 
observes the wolves and deduces that a plague is impending. He then establishes a strict 
regimen of diet, hygiene, and exercise for the men, who thereby avoid the plague which 
would soon ravage the area. Palamedes thus saves the allies from Odysseus’s ignorant 
advice which, had they followed, would have killed them. 
 The task of providing for the Greek soldiers finds Palamedes and Odysseus in 
another antagonistic relationship. Odysseus repairs to Thrace in search of corn and comes 
                                                 
4
 There is a tradition which claims that Iphigenia was Helen’s daughter by Theseus, prior 
to her marriage to Menelaus, and that she gave this daughter to her sister, Clytaemnestra, 
who then passed her off to Agamemnon as her own. Theseus, of course, was later killed 
by Lycomedes (Lib. 3.10.9 and J. G. Frazer’s note). 
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back with nothing, while Palamedes returns with an abundant yield. Some writers say 
that Palamedes serves as part of the group that goes to Delos in order to bring back 
Anius’s daughters, the Oenotropi, each of whom Dionysus has endowed with the power 
to turn anything she touches into olive oil, corn, and wine, respectively (Phillips 269-
70).5 Beginning with his sterilizing his fields at Ithaca, Odysseus finds himself in one 
emasculating incident after another. At every turn he is outdone, and undone, by his bête 
noire, Palamedes. 
 Finally, one should note the incident told by Ptolemaeus Chennus in which 
Palamedes discloses the identity of Epipole, a young Greek woman who has disguised 
herself as a man in order to join the expedition to Troy (Phillips 269). This incident fits 
into the preceding series of revelations and recognitions in which sanity is gendered as 
masculine, and madness feminine, with regard to one’s fitness to serve in the military. At 
Ithaca, Palamedes reveals Odysseus’s sanity. At Lycomedes’s court, Odysseus, himself 
disguised, reveals Achilles’s masculinity. At Troy, Palamedes reveals Epipole’s 
femininity and has the Greek army stone her to death. Here one finds a corollary to 
Palamedes’s exposure of Odysseus’s ineptitude at the expense of the latter’s manhood, as 
well as the foreshadowing of Palamedes’s own death by stoning. 
 Perhaps Palamedes’s unclear personal background makes him such an unlikely 
adversary. Whereas Odysseus is clearly established at Ithaca, Palamedes seems to come 
                                                 
5
 Other accounts hold that it is not Palamedes, but Odysseus, who goes on this 
reconnaissance mission to Delos. The significance of such an ambiguity will become 
apparent later in the argument. 
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from elsewhere, and that is perhaps as specific a locale as one may venture. With no clear 
fatherland, he has already appeared as an outsider of vague, seemingly extraterrestrial 
heritage. It is therefore appropriate that some writers, such as Philostratus, identify 
Palamedes as the grandson of Poseidon (Her. 25.25). Apparently homeless, Palamedes 
therefore embodies the liminal, implicitly aquatic space between homes: 
Wüst, who remarks that Palamedes is very weakly anchored in early 
legend, is inclined to agree with Curtius that he represents elements of 
Greek culture that were borrowed from the Phoenicians. He argues that the 
Greek tradition seems to connect him with the trading and seafaring 
peoples of the east. (Phillips 267) 
So Palamedes comes to represent the sea for Odysseus. At Ithaca he is the Ionian 
whisking him off to Troy. Once there, he is the Aegean beckoning him to return home. 
 The sea is present in the very salt Odysseus sows instead of seed. From the 
moment he makes this choice, he is incessantly undermined by Palamedes. Odysseus has 
become impotent, no longer capable of fulfilling his patriarchal function of provider, 
neither at home, nor among his men. This motif of impotence has various echoes, not the 
least of which is in the name of the most valuable of Anius’s daughters whom Palamedes 
seeks to procure where Odysseus has failed: Spermo—that is, “seed” (Epit. 3.10). 
W. B. Stanford refers to Palamedes as “a kind of superfluous Prometheus in 
inventiveness and a superfluous Odysseus in his prudent counsels” (Ulysses Theme 257).6 
                                                 
6
 Palamedes and Prometheus are alike beyond their both being martyred for their 
contributions in the way of culture. As principal provider for the troops (pro-, before + 
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Writers variously credit Palamedes as the inventor of dice, counting, several letters of the 
alphabet, wine-making, jokes, and an early forerunner of chess.7 These are but the 
highlights of a career which may well have made even Benjamin Franklin blush. In one 
sense Palamedes anticipates the dramatic stock character of the raisonneur.8 I would take 
this claim one step further to include the contemporary figure of the know-it-all, the 
nerdy gadget man. To use an example from popular culture, if the Greek army were the 
Goonies, Palamedes would most assuredly be Data. 
Elsewhere, Phillips describes Palamedes as “the clever inventor, contriver, and 
teacher, so useful at the siege and otherwise a man of so amiable and exalted a character 
that he almost seems too good to live” (267). Evidently, Odysseus finds him superfluous 
as well. The Ithacan king’s enmity grows until he conspires against his rival, and there 
are several versions of Palamedes’s death at Odysseus’s hands. Too good to live, indeed. 
 
The Three Deaths of Palamedes 
Hyginus’s version of Palamedes’s death is the most elaborate, in which Odysseus 
convinces Agamemnon to move their camp for a day, based on a dream he claims to have 
                                                                                                                                                 
videre, to see), Palamedes echoes the “forethought” signified by Prometheus’s own name. 
So does the eagle, which daily torments Prometheus on Mount Caucasus, appear in 
Penelope’s dream as a symbol of Odysseus slaying the suitors (Od. 19.508-58). 
7
 E. D. Phillips provides a thoroughly-annotated catalogue of the inventions attributed to 
Palamedes (270-72). 
8
 I would like to acknowledge Dr. Murray Brown for bringing this comparison to my 
attention. 
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had. Odysseus then buries a sum of gold under the former site of Palamedes’s tent, 
compels a Phrygian prisoner to draft a letter, sends a second prisoner to kill the first, then 
reveals the letter, “From Priam to Palamedes,” promising the same amount of gold now 
under the latter’s tent in exchange for his treason, which the army punishes by death 
(Fab. 105).9 Apollodorus adds that the method was by stoning (Epit. 3.8). Ovid tells the 
story in essentially the same form, framed within a speech by Ajax (Met. 13.33-62). 
Some variations notwithstanding, Hyginus and Ovid present the most popular 
version of Palamedes’s death. Others are less subtle. Pausanias, for example, is quite 
succinct: “Palamedes, as I know from reading the epic poem Cypria, was drowned when 
he put out to catch fish, and his murderers were Diomedes and Odysseus.” Pausanias then 
mentions a seemingly trivial detail: “Palamedes has no beard, but the others have” 
(10.31.2). I shall return to this observation later in the argument. 
There remains one final version of Odysseus’s murder of Palamedes. According 
to Dictys Cretensis, whom R. M. Frazer claims lived sometime between AD 66-250, 
Odysseus and Diomedes lead Palamedes to a well which they say contains gold. They 
then lower him down and hurl rocks upon him until, depending on their accuracy, he is 
                                                 
9
 Hyginus’s version contains one crucial internal inconsistency. When elsewhere 
crediting Palamedes among the Greek alphabet’s inventors, he attributes “Π” and “Ψ” to 
the Sicilian Epicharmus (Fab. 277). However, as Epicharmus did not exist until the late 
sixth century BC, neither “Priam” nor “Palamedes,” both of which begin with “Π,” could 
have appeared in the letter in question. Susan Woodford’s observation of “Telamedes” as 
a common alternate spelling may solve this orthographical quandary (168). 
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either stoned to death or buried alive. There is reason to suspect Agamemnon’s inclusion 
in the plot, as Dictys writes that many wanted Palamedes to replace him as their 
commander-in-chief. Dictys even accounts for the murder by way of the following 
metastatic parenthesis: “(It is characteristic of human nature to yield to resentments and 
envy; one does not easily allow oneself to be surpassed by a better.)” (2.15). This detail 
of the well appears only in Dictys’s account, which, as we shall soon see, is an utter 
forgery. 
 
Dictys and Dares Go to Troy 
Dictys Cretensis and Dares Phrygius both purport that their respective histories of 
the Trojan War are firsthand accounts which therefore antedate Homer’s. In Dares’s Fall 
of Troy, which strays wildly from other reports, Palamedes is initially detained by illness 
and joins the Greeks later at Tenedos, an island near Troy. For several years he complains 
about the army’s leadership until he stages a mutiny to which Agamemnon yields, and 
the Greeks elect Palamedes their commander-in-chief. He later kills Deiphobus and 
Sarpedon in battle before Paris kills him with an arrow to the neck.10 Dares’s report of 
Palamedes’s sedition and illustrious career as leader of the Greek army realizes the idea 
latent in Dictys’s version, in which Palamedes dies before he has an opportunity to 
replace Agamemnon. 
                                                 
10
 Dares may have misappropriated this detail from Pseudo-Alcidamas’s version in which 
Odysseus’s incriminating letter is found hidden inside an arrow (qtd. in Woodford 165). 
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To usurp such an authority, Dictys and Dares capitalized on anti-Homeric currents 
already present. As Frazer notes, the first popular criticism against Homer concerned his 
portrayal of the gods as humanlike and his plots’ reliance on the supernatural. Notably, 
Dares took his own name from a character in the Iliad to add to the veracity of his tale as 
an eyewitness account, thus using Homer’s credibility against him (Il. 5.9). The second 
grievance against Homer concerned his having overlooked certain characters such as 
Palamedes (Frazer 5-6). 
Later in the argument, I am going to be rather harsh and moralistic with regard to 
Dictys and Dares, but one should bear in mind that we do not always know what liberties 
other ancient writers took with their materials. The difference is that Dictys and Dares 
actually claimed to have been present during the war, and that they were caught. To their 
credit, it took critics nearly two millennia to discover the fraud. As we get more into the 
Odyssean spirit, we may perhaps applaud the success of their ruse. 
 For example, Philostratus’s account is roughly contemporary with and every bit as 
fictitious as Dictys’s and Dares’s. As Stefan Merkle points out, Philostratus twice 
undermines the very basis of Dictys’s account: “Protesilaus declares that Idomenus did 
not take part in the Trojan War (Heroicus 30); then we read (Heroicus 26.10) that the use 
of writing was unknown at that time. . . . Dictys maintained that he wrote his work in 
Phoenician letters and as Idomenus’s official chronicler” (193-94). Philostratus even 
outright contradicts the Cypria when he refers to Palamedes’s “soft beard . . . springing 
up with the promise of curls” (33.39). However, he merits more leniency insofar as he 
never claims to have been at Troy. Instead, he frames his version of Palamedes in the 
Heroicus as a story told by the ghost of Protesilaos, the first Greek soldier to die on the 
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Trojan campaign, who could nonetheless “observe the affairs of mortals” after his death 
(7.3). 
For a similar reason, I would not include Dante in the company of Dictys and 
Dares, although his Ulysses is every bit as fictitious as their Palamedes. First of all, 
Dante’s Ulysses is an infernal shade—a spirit akin to Protesilaos. Second, the nature of 
Dante’s journey through the realms of the dead clearly places its center of credibility 
elsewhere. One’s suspension of disbelief is contingent upon the Commedia’s very 
premise. Put another way, if Homer were George Lucas, one might be tempted to view 
these later writers as the countless novelists and graphic artists who have tackled the new 
adventures of Han and Chewie. One must nonetheless be careful not to fall into too much 
snobbery with regard to canonicity. These are not quite unauthorized “spin-offs” loosely 
based on Homer’s original series. However, any considerations of the ways in which 
these later, apocryphal tales complement the Trojan War canon should take into account 
their inherent belatedness and contingency. 
 
Philostratus Tests Occam’s Razor 
Philostratus’s Heroicus provides perhaps the most detailed portrait of the 
antagonism between Palamedes and Odysseus, relating lengthy altercations between the 
two. One extraordinary scene depicts Palamedes, in the thick of battle, giving Achilles 
fighting lessons: “he resembled a lion tamer who calms and stirs up a well-bred lion, and 
he did these things without even giving way, but while hurling darts and being on guard 
against them, standing firm against shields, and pursuing warriors in close formation” 
(33.21). After Palamedes’s murder by treason, which in Philostratus’s account essentially 
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follows Hyginus’s version, Odysseus has Agamemnon threaten to kill anyone who 
attempts to bury the body. The greater Ajax defies this edict, performs Palamedes’s 
funeral rites, and refuses to rejoin the Greeks in battle—that is, until he sees how badly 
the Greeks are faring against the Trojans. Achilles’s wrath and grief last much longer 
(33.31-36). 
Dictys and Dares are not the only writers who attempt to account for Palamedes’s 
omission from the Iliad and Odyssey. Writers as early as Strabo had already begun to 
suspect that Palamedes was a creation of later poets wishing to elaborate on Homer’s 
tales (8.6.2). Philostratus provides some particularly ingenious justifications for 
Palamedes’s absence from Homer’s narrative. In his Life of Apollonius of Tyana, devoted 
to the first-century AD Roman mystic, Philostratus describes his subject’s encounter with 
Palamedes’s reincarnation in India: “He is not our follower,” Iarchus tells Apollonius, 
“but is like a lion, a reluctant captive, a prisoner who suspects us for taming and stroking 
him. This boy was once Palamedes at Troy, and his two greatest enemies are Odysseus 
and Homer, Odysseus for devising a scheme against him by which he was stoned to 
death, Homer for not thinking him worth a single line” (3.22.2). The lion tamer imagery 
recurs as in the Heroicus, but here Palamedes’s reincarnation resents his captors for 
condescending to domesticate him as he had once bravely trained Achilles. 
Later, Apollonius speaks of the time when he conjured Achilles, who allowed him 
five questions regarding the Trojan War, the last of which follows: “‘How is it that 
Homer does not know about Palamedes, or if he does excises him from his account of 
you all?’ ‘If Palamedes did not come to Troy,’ he replied, ‘Troy did not exist either. But 
since that wisest and most warlike of heroes was killed by a ruse of Odysseus, Homer 
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does not bring him into his poem to avoid celebrating his crimes’” (4.16.6). With the 
above rhetorical formula, Philostratus thus makes Troy’s historicity contingent on 
Palamedes’s existence, assigning both the same level of reality, and rhetorically 
manipulates Palamedes’s textual absence into evidence which bolsters the hero’s 
historical stature and importance to the superlative degree. 
In his Heroicus, Philostratus claims that Homer travelled to Ithaca to perform 
necromancy on Odysseus’s ghost, who then agreed to tell him the entire story of the 
Trojan War on the sole condition that it contain absolutely no mention of Palamedes. The 
ghost claimed that it was soon to be judged in Hades and awaited its punishment by the 
Furies: “Palamedes is prosecuting me for his murder, and I know I’m guilty . . . but if 
men on earth do not think I did this to Palamedes, what happens here will not totally 
destroy me. So don’t bring Palamedes to Troy or make him a soldier or say he was wise. 
For other poets will say so, but no one will believe them if you don’t confirm it” (43.15; 
qtd. in Anderson 245). In this almost Faustian bargain, Philostratus makes Homer wholly 
complicit in the conspiracy to erase Palamedes from history. 
 
The Three Lives of Palamedes 
At this point it should be clear that Palamedes is a forbidden subject. I have 
arrived at three interpretive modes by which one may account for his existence as such. 
For the purposes of the following readings, I shall now leave behind the previous 
distinction regarding the Trojan War as either historical or mythological event. The 
question of Palamedes now concerns narrativity more than historicity. 
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According to the first mode, Palamedes was present all along as Odysseus’s rival. 
One may even consider him as a double insofar as he stands in an antagonistic relation to 
Odysseus. According to this reading, Homer simply left him out of the Iliad and Odyssey 
either because, as Philostratus claims, he wanted to be more judicious to Odysseus, or 
because Odysseus’s ghost asked him nicely to do so. In any case, this first mode is easily 
the least compelling and hardly merits further comment. 
The second interpretive mode exists on the premise that Palamedes was inserted 
into the narrative centuries later as a rival but also as an archetypal figure. Dana Ferrin 
Sutton points out that “[i]n the dramatic and rhetorical literature of the fifth century BC 
Palamedes was firmly established as a mythological archetype of the creative intellectual 
. . .” (112). Phillips corroborates this point and contextualizes Palamedes as “a general 
culture-hero, who is oddly sorted with the conventional warriors of the Trojan cycle.” He 
further notes Palamedes’s popularity among “dramatists and rhetoricians of democratic or 
progressive sympathies, to whom the general tone of the heroic world . . . seemed 
repellently barbarous” (271). This repulsion is central to understanding another function 
of Palamedes’s character within this second mode—that of the vanishing mediator.11 
In Slavoj Žižek’s appropriation of the vanishing mediator from Fredric Jameson, 
the term signifies a way of bridging an ideological gap. “Once we are within a field of 
meaning,” Žižek writes, “it is by definition impossible to adopt an external attitude 
toward it; there is no continuous passage from its outside to its inside—as Althusser put 
                                                 
11
 I am indebted to Dr. Christopher Kocela for his suggestion that I apply this strand of 
Žižek’s thought to Palamedes. 
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it, ideology has no outside” (They Know Not 203). However, Žižek applies this concept 
not to the transition from one ideology to another, nor from Hegelian thesis to antithesis, 
but to the origin of ideology itself: “[w]hat is necessarily foreclosed here—the 
‘forbidden’ mediator which must vanish, become invisible, turn into a ‘missing link,’ if 
the reign of law is to be established—is of course the ‘pathological’ act of violence out of 
which ‘civil constitution’ grew . . .” (205-06). Civilization thus emerges as nature subject 
to Symbolic law. 
This emergence of civilization is therefore wholly contingent upon Žižek’s 
imperative that the mediator must vanish from cultural memory. It must, according to 
Žižek, “undergo a ‘primordial repression’ if the reign of law is to take hold.” The 
mediator therefore occupies an “uncanny third domain . . . the abyss of absolute freedom: 
the pure Evil of a violence which is ‘no longer’ nature . . . and ‘not yet’ culture” (206). 
Insofar as Palamedes has been repressed within the collective consciousness of culture, 
he vanishes from its accounts accordingly. He has enabled the transition from a band of 
barbarous warriors to the intellectual culture typified by Athens centuries later. Put 
another way, perhaps Homer cannot refer to Palamedes because Palamedes is precisely 
what made a poet such as Homer possible. When later poets restored the “missing link” 
of Palamedes to the narrative, they mimetically reconstituted the violence of his removal 
from history (via repression) in Odysseus’s physical removal of him from the narrative 
(via murder). This insertion of Palamedes is in fact doubly mimetic inasmuch as these 
authors implicitly—and in Dictys’s and Dares’s cases, explicitly—stake a priority over 
the precursor, Homer, just as Palamedes threatens to usurp Odysseus’s paternal priority. 
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This discussion of repressed material is entirely in keeping with Palamedes as the 
purported inventor of jokes. First of all, one would hardly think that such a thing would 
have needed inventing. Laughter surely existed, but this distinction concerns the 
spontaneous solicitation of laughter through language. To borrow a Promethean 
corollary, if laughter were fire, the joke would be the match. However, the attribution of 
the joke to Palamedes belies a repressive mechanism similar to what Žižek describes 
above. Sigmund Freud, for example, refers to Kuno Fischer’s observation that jokes 
“must bring forward something that is concealed or hidden” (qtd. in Freud 11). Freud 
goes on to note how the “repressive activity of civilization” prevents one’s enjoyment 
through censorhip; however, “jokes provide a means of undoing the renunciation and 
retrieving what was lost” (120). Therefore, Palamedes, who represents the repressed link 
between nature and culture, becomes known as the inventor of the means whereby one 
may enjoy hitherto-repressed material. 
One should note that, although Palamedes accomplishes more with this cleverness 
than Odysseus ever had, he is in reality merely preserving the status quo. He musters the 
men for the expedition to Troy, but once there, what does he really do? He keeps the men 
fed—no small feat, to be sure. He fills their idle hours, keeping them occupied with dice 
games and the alphabet, yet in the final analysis Palamedes does nothing to further the 
Greeks’ progress. He merely keeps them alive, occupied. Such a role would especially 
befit the purported inventor of jokes. 
Palamedes’s accomplishments, both cultural and agricultural, are laudable; 
however, what is needed is not mere strategy of preservation, but of military ingenuity. 
Only in Odysseus’s hands can this cleverness be turned to ends which, while too sinister 
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for pious Palamedes to stomach, nonetheless bring victory to the Greeks. Just as 
Palamedes hoists Odysseus by his own petard in invoking the oath of Tyndareus, so does 
Odysseus’s masterstroke and coup de grâce, in Hyginus’s version, entail using the very 
alphabet he has learned from Palamedes to forge the letter which seals Palamedes’s fate. 
According to the second interpretive mode, Palamedes was inserted into 
Odysseus’s narrative much later. However, we now read Palamedes as part of that story. 
The story, insofar as it exists on the page and in one’s cognitive process of reading it, 
contains Palamedes. The result entails something akin to textual time travel or the theater 
of the absurd. One envisions Odysseus, his sanity revealed at Ithaca, looking up 
incredulously at the stranger, asking, “Who are you?” “Palamedes.” “Who is 
Palamedes?” “No one, but poets centuries from now will create and place me here. We 
are being read. I am in your story now. Get used to it.” One could even imagine a more 
fanciful version in which Palamedes’s incessant interpretation of their metatextual 
situation is what causes Odysseus to murder him. 
The first two readings present Palamedes as Odysseus’s double, a broad literary 
term which signifies, among other things, a certain mutual antagonism and mirroring. 
“Palamedes” does not exist as such until he is named by poets centuries later. However, 
as one reads their narratives which posit a separate existence for him, there emerges a 
third interpretive mode which construes a kind of Doppelgänger fantasy. Although not 
interchangeable with the double, the Doppelgänger nonetheless represents a specific kind 
of doubling. Within the psychoanalytic and literary paradigm of the Doppelgänger, 
Palamedes would be the same person as Odysseus. Palamedes would not objectively exist 
except in Odysseus’s imagination. Palamedes, embodying both ager and agere, a 
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provider of sustenance and man of action, is the realized form of the hero which lies 
latent in Odysseus. He is not only “the Inventor” but, more important, the invented. I 
submit that Palamedes is the alter ego of Odysseus—an alias, a nom de guerre—in short, 
not only a double, but a Doppelgänger. 
 
What’s a Doppelgänger? 
 Although I intend to discuss the Doppelgänger12 paradigm as it gradually unfurls 
throughout the argument, a few preliminary remarks may be useful here. The double is a 
broader term, and among its literary indicators are mirrors, shadows, and twins, to name 
but a few. Of course, a situation or plot may also be said to double or mirror a similar 
situation. The Doppelgänger—literally a “double-goer”—is a specific kind of double. 
Scholars typically credit Jean Paul and E. T. A. Hoffmann among the theme’s founding 
fathers, but it also has precedents in the dramatic commonplace of plots involving 
mistaken identity and in the philosophical duality of body and soul. 
Otto Rank’s work on the subject remains seminal, exploring the theme in its 
psychoanalytic, literary, and anthropological modes. Harry Tucker, Jr., in his introduction 
to Rank’s work, notes that the psychoanalytic contribution to the field illustrates that “the 
double-theme derived not so much from the authors’ conscious fondness for describing 
preternatural situations (Hoffmann), or separate parts of their personalities (Jean Paul), as 
                                                 
12
 I have retained the German (and therefore capitalized and italicized) spelling simply 
because I find it somewhat off-putting and because the signifier thus befits its signified 
with overtones which the English appropriation, “doppelganger,” does not have. 
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from their unconscious impulse to lend imagery to a universal human problem—that of 
the relation of the self to the self” (xiv). With that understood, I shall nonetheless discuss 
each of the above authorial motives in turn and, later, illustrate the first two by way of 
Tyler Durden and Edward Hyde, respectively. 
The Student of Prague serves as Rank’s cinematic prototype and point of 
departure, and I base the following summary on his synopsis. In short, Balduin, a young 
student, sees his reflection step out of a mirror and walk into the world. It continues to 
haunt him at the most inopportune moments, specifically frustrating his romantic 
endeavors. Just as he is about to take his own life, his Doppelgänger reappears, and 
Balduin shoots him instead. The Doppelgänger promptly disappears, and Balduin looks 
down only to find that he has fatally shot himself (Rank 4-6). 
This film provides a basic template for many Doppelgänger plots. Rank concisely 
contextualizes the underlying psychology when he observes 
a powerful consciousness of guilt which forces the hero no longer to 
accept the responsibility for certain actions of his ego, but to place it upon 
another ego, a double, who . . . appears in other forms of the theme as a 
beneficient admonitor (e.g., William Wilson) who is directly addressed as 
the “conscience” of the person (e.g., Dorian Gray, etc.). As Freud has 
demonstrated, this awareness of guilt, having various sources, measures on 
the one hand the distance between the ego-ideal and the attained reality; 
on the other, it is nourished by a powerful fear of death and creates strong 
tendencies toward self-punishment, which also imply suicide. (76-77) 
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Rank’s analysis is primarily Freudian; however, more recent critics, such as John T. 
Irwin, have supplemented this paradigm with a Lacanian one. I should therefore briefly 
differentiate between two key terms which will recur as my argument develops. I take 
Lacan’s “ideal ego” to signify the idealized, unattainable, Imaginary self—the reflected 
self in Lacan’s mirror stage.13 I take the “ego-ideal” to mean that point within the 
superego from which one perceives oneself with repulsion, thus approximating the moral 
function of the conscience. Palamedes immediately establishes himself as both the 
specular embodiment of the unrealized hero latent in Odysseus (ideal ego) and the point 
from which Odysseus perceives himself with the paternal “No” (ego-ideal). At Ithaca, 
Odysseus acquiesces; at Troy, his refusal of Palamedes as superego entails nothing short 
of psychological patricide. 
 With these distinctions in mind, we may now set about testing this admittedly 
peculiar thesis. I shall begin on the semiotic level, investigating the linguistic origins of 
the doubles’ names in relation to their shared history. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Throughout, I have observed the common practice of capitalization (i.e., “Imaginary,” 
“Symbolic”) when using Lacanian terminology. I should point out here that “Imaginary” 
primarily means “referring to images.” I will, however, play on this meaning, especially 
with regard to “Imaginary friends” in the sense of “make-believe.” Similarly, “Symbolic” 
refers to the realm of language, not necessarily to symbolism in the broader literary sense. 
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Some Names of Palamedes 
Various etymologies of Palamedes’s name refer either to his death—suggesting 
that he was named posthumously as a character, not at birth as a man—or to Odysseus 
himself. Tiresias foretells that Odysseus will only know a peaceful death when he has 
travelled far enough inland, with an oar in hand, to encounter men who do not know what 
the oar is (Od. 11.119-37; 23.264-84). However, we should consider this prophecy in 
light of one potential etymology of Palamedes’s name: “pala was applied anciently . . . to 
the blade or broad part of an oar” (“Pala”). Similarly, the Latin palma, the “broad end or 
blade of an oar,” derives from the Greek palame (“Palma”). Susan Woodford also notes 
an early tradition according to which Oeax sends word of his brother Palamedes’s death 
to their father, Nauplius, by inscribing the news on an oar (166). Thus the oar, after which 
Palamedes may have been named, is inextricably involved with his death and its 
historical transmission. Perhaps Homer has thereby encrypted a second sense of 
Tiresias’s prophecy—that Odysseus will never know rest until he has found men who 
have never heard of Palamedes. In a broader historical sense, such ignorance is precisely 
what Odysseus’s ghost seeks to establish through Homer in Philostratus’s account. 
If one accepts the premise that Odysseus and Palamedes are the same person, then 
there are two other incidents worth mentioning with regard to anonymity. The first occurs 
when Odysseus tricks the Cyclops, Polyphemus, by identifying himself as “Nobody,” so 
the other Cyclopes believe that Polyphemus has injured himself (Od. 9.366-67). This ruse 
is especially pointed insofar as “Nobody” bests Polyphemus, whose name signifies 
widespread fame—literally, “abounding in songs and legends” (“Πολύφηµος”). More 
important is the hidden corollary to, and perhaps a compulsive repetition of, Odysseus’s 
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encounter with his Imaginary Doppelgänger. The Cyclopes envision Polyphemus as we 
find Fight Club’s protagonist, who thinks that he is fighting Tyler Durden when he is 
really brawling with himself.14 
The second instance concerning anonymity appears in Plato’s Republic, when 
each soul in Hades must choose its next life. Odysseus’s choice of identity entails a 
negation of identity: 
And it fell out that the soul of Odysseus drew the last lot of all and came 
to make its choice, and, from memory of its former toils having flung 
away ambition, went about for a long time in quest of the life of an 
ordinary citizen who minded his own business, and with difficulty found it 
lying in some corner disregarded by the others, and upon seeing it said that 
it would have done the same had it drawn the first lot, and chose it gladly. 
(10.620C) 
Whereas Philostratus’s Odysseus entreats Homer to avoid his soul’s destruction by the 
Furies, Plato’s embodies a poignant resignation. This is the last thing that Odysseus does 
before he drinks of the River Lethe, thereby forgetting his life as Odysseus and becoming 
another. He wishes to be a nobody. 
 H. G. Liddell and Robert Scott, in their Lexicon, translate Palamedes’s name as 
“the Inventor” (“Παλαµήδης”). Here one again finds a moniker which must have been 
assigned after the formation of an identity, not at birth. The related word, παλάµη, which 
may signify both “the palm of the hand, the hand” and, metaphorically, “cunning, art, a 
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 I intend to address other parallels with Fight Club later in the argument. 
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device,” complements the above meaning in the sense of invention as handiwork 
(“Παλάµη”). If we may gain anything from a translation of a translation, perhaps it is in 
the sense of Palamedes as “in-comer,” both for its conveyance of textual intrusion and its 
connotation of phallic potency. As regards the latter portion of Palamedes’s name, the 
suffix -medes is a common ending, shared, for example, by Odysseus’s cohort Diomedes. 
It often indicates a measurement. 
Palamedes’s name implies not only invention but also guilt. A related entry sheds 
a sinister light on the root of our hero’s name. Παλάµη relates to πᾰλαµναîος—“one 
guilty of violence, a blood-guilty man, murderer”—and to an early form of the name 
“Alastor” (αλάστωρ), “the avenger of blood” (“Πᾰλαµναîος”). At a glance, the attribution 
of such an epithet to guiltless Palamedes might appear absurd. However, Palamedes is the 
guilty one in that he instills guilt in the other. He is the projection of Odysseus’s guilt. 
 Insofar as stoning is common to two of the three deaths of Palamedes, it should 
come as no surprise that yet another potential derivation of the first half of Palamedes’s 
name is pala, a variant of the Latin pila, meaning a “pillar, pier, or mole of stone” (“Pile, 
n.,” def. 3). This sense recalls the episode with Epipole as well as the revenge which 
Nauplius, Palamedes’s father, exacts on the returning Greeks, lighting false beacons and 
causing them to crash on the stones. 
 
What’s an Odysseus? 
 Another batch of etymologies pertains not to Palamedes’s death but to Odysseus 
himself. One such derivation involves the group including palaestra and Palaemon. 
Whether or not this etymology rings true, the image of the wrestler is apt, for it conveys 
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the struggle, the agon in which Odysseus is engaged.15 Another example of this 
etymology’s relevance concerns the encounter with Arnaeus, whom the other Ithacans 
call Irus—after Iris, messenger of Olympus—due to his unfailing readiness to run 
errands. Odysseus, his own errantry behind him, has returned to Ithaca, but has not yet 
fully disclosed himself. Irus provokes him into a fight, and before long a crowd of suitors 
has gathered to watch the spectacle. Homer provides a telling phrase which explains, in 
part, the motivation for the brawl. Of Irus, he writes, “He came now, and was for driving 
Odysseus from his own house” (Od. 18.7-8). In order to keep himself from being thus 
driven away, Odysseus must vanquish the errand boy, an aspect of his character with 
which, in light of his perennial wandering, he will risk being identified by later traditions. 
Homer describes the agon with Irus as a boxing match, but both Hyginus and 
Apollodorus indicate that it was a match not of boxing, but of wrestling (Fab. 126; Epit. 
7.32). 
 Odysseus is specifically named at birth, yet the sense of his name foreshadows his 
encounter with Palamedes. From the outset of the Odyssey, Homer frequently uses 
Odysseus’s name in the sense which means “man of pain” or “to will pain to.”16 The last 
play on Odysseus’s name in the narrative relates the first such use chronologically—that 
is, the naming of the infant Odysseus by his maternal grandfather, Autolycus, “who 
excelled all men in thievery and oaths” (Od. 19.392). The original passage from Homer 
                                                 
15
 Odysseus’s knavish grandfather, Autolycus, first teaches Palaemon (better known as 
Hercules) how to wrestle (Lib. 2.6.3). 
16
 Od. 1.62; 5.340, 423; 14.145-47; 19.275, 407-09. 
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goes as follows: “Inasmuch as I have come here as one that has willed pain to 
[odyssamenos] many, both men and women, over the fruitful earth, therefore let the name 
by which this child is named be Odysseus” (Od. 19.405-12). Although a seemingly trivial 
phrase, “the fruitful earth,” in light of Odysseus’s later salting of the fields at Ithaca, takes 
on a tone of unwitting prophetic irony. George Chapman’s rendering, “the many feeding 
earth,” further underscores this sense (19.568). 
For odyssamenos, Liddel and Scott add “to be wroth against, to hate” 
(“Ὀδύσσοµαι”). “In the most famous digression in literature,” Fritz Senn elaborates, 
“Odysseus is named in what appears the most arbitrary and whimsical way, in almost 
Saussurean fashion, and yet the random signifier becomes potently ominous.” However, 
Senn notes the double register which the signifier, “odyssamenos,” bears when it 
becomes the signified of the new, “eponymous” signifier, “Odysseus.” “Since 
grandfather Autolykos passing by at the birth happened to be ‘odyssamenos,’ the child 
was called, ‘eponymously,’ ‘Odysseus.’ The participle form ‘odyssamenos’ is either 
‘made angry’ or else ‘making angry’ . . . [I]t suggests a man connected with wrath or 
odium, and it came to signify both a wrath inflicted and a wrath suffered” (28). This 
nominal duality thus enacts, at the level of the signifier, the subjective struggle central to 
Odysseus’s character. 
One need not be a strict structuralist to illustrate the pun’s elusiveness. T. E. 
Lawrence, in a 1931 letter written “in great haste” to Bruce Rogers, raises the 
semiological stakes of Odysseus’s name to some comedic effect: 
Palmer translated Odyssamenos (the pun-word) as “odious.” I think there 
is no other English word which preserves even the shadow of a pun. The 
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Greek word means grieved, angered, disgusted, peeved. Odious is not very 
close: it refers to the other men and women, and not to Autolycus; he was 
fed up with them, not they with him: at least he thought so. I have no 
doubt the disgust was mutual, myself: and so odious is rather good. But it 
does stretch things. Palmer says “since I come hither odious to many men 
and women . . . therefore Odysseus be his name.” I should have said—“let 
his name be Odysseus, for their odiousness.” Or better still “for the 
odiousness” or “in odiousness” (this is really pretty good). 
Odysseus, odyssamenos’s namesake, embodies the word’s fundamental ambivalence as 
active and passive—Odysseus, he who hates and is hated—a mutuality which implies 
duality, reflexivity. The syllogism is brief: Odysseus hates Palamedes. Palamedes is 
Odysseus. Therefore, Odysseus hates Odysseus. Put another way: Odysseus hates 
another; however, the other is Odysseus. 
 What is at work here is an externalization of an interior duality of guilt and guile, 
of will and wile. Odysseus, too clever for the war into which he is thrust, his sense of 
heroic duty ever at odds with his innovativeness, must come to terms with his ingenuity. 
“But once at the war,” Joyce notes, “the conscientious objector became a jusqu’auboutist. 
When the others wanted to abandon the siege he insisted on staying till Troy should fall” 
(16). However, Odysseus cannot devote himself to the war until he accepts his having 
been unable to get himself out of it in the first place. Palamedes enables the 
objectification of a subjective struggle so that Odysseus can embrace the cleverness that 
failed him at Ithaca. 
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The Lone Wolf’s Grandson 
Having traced various etymologies of Palamedes’s and Odysseus’s names, we 
may now consider them in light of Odysseus’s relation to his maternal grandfather, 
Autolycus.17 The above readings of Odysseus’s name are in close keeping with William 
Walter Merry’s 1878 observation of “a double sense, as incurring and dealing out wrath”; 
however, as Stanford notes, this view would soon succumb to a strictly active reading 
(“Homeric Etymology” 209). Given Autolycus’s duplicitous nature, his intentions are 
appropriately dubious. (One should not be surprised that his name means “lone wolf.”) 
Stanford further points out that Odysseus seems to have been “doomed to cleverness at 
his birth,” although “Autolycus meant [the name] primarily as a memorial of his own 
unpopularity” (Ulysses Theme 12). Intentions notwithstanding, Autolycus provides an 
indispensable context for much of Odysseus’s career. 
The episode with Dolon and Odysseus in Iliad 10 brings this genealogical 
significance to the fore. Stanford condenses the encounter as follows: “Dolon . . . set out 
by night from the Trojan camp to spy on the Greeks; was waylaid by Odysseus and 
Diomedes; was tricked by Odysseus’s ambiguous words into believing that his life would 
be spared if he told them everything; and was immediately killed by Diomedes without 
any demur from Odysseus” (15). Just prior to this meeting, however, Odysseus dons a 
felt cap. More specifically, it is the felt cap that Autolycus had stolen years before and 
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 Many of my remarks on this subject closely follow W. B. Stanford’s excellent study in 
The Ulysses Theme. 
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which Odysseus indirectly inherits from him—the same felt cap which, in other versions, 
Odysseus dons just before first meeting Palamedes at Ithaca.18 
Stanford cites a substantial list of passages in the Iliad which refer to Odysseus’s 
expertise in devices, or doloi (13). He therefore notes the “irony . . . in Dolon’s name—
‘Wily-man, son of Good-planner’; for this Wilyman was doomed to meet a wilier man in 
the grandson of that Autolycus whose name Homer had mentioned (perhaps with studied 
casualness) shortly before” (15). By now it should be clear that Homer, without 
mentioning Palamedes by name, nonetheless appears to make a veiled reference to 
Palamedes’s story through the encounter with Dolon. In both incidents, Odysseus puts on 
the felt cap, deceives a man whose name contains the meaning of “a device” and whom 
he perceives as a Trojan spy— in Palamedes’s case, by his own machination—and, in the 
company of Diomedes, has the man murdered.19 In the episode with Dolon, the Iliad 
therefore presents a version of the entire Palamedes narrative in compressed form. 
Ernest Jones, in his “Phantasy of the Reversal of Generations,” contextualizes the 
grandfather within the Freudian Oedipal paradigm as follows: “A experiences . . . hostile 
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 Lest one envision a kind of nondescript beanie, I should describe the cap itself. Homer 
refers to it as a helmet made of hide, lined with the teeth and tusks of a boar on the 
outside, with a felt lining on the inside (Il. 2. 260-65). 
19
 Stanford’s observation that “one cannot ignore the possibility that Palamedes really 
was a traitor in the original legend” is indispensable to any discussion of Palamedes 
(Ulysses Theme 84). However, I have found no evidence which would commend 
following this speculation through to its consequences. 
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impulses directed against his father B, and fears that his father will punish (e.g., castrate) 
him for them in the appropriate talion manner. When A grows up, he fears to have a son, 
C, lest C, the unconscious equivalent of B, carry out this punishment on him.” It is along 
these lines that Jones explains “the constant identification of grandson with grandfather; 
both are equally feared by the father, who has reason to dread their retaliation for his 
guilty wishes against them” (412). That Autolycus is Odysseus’s maternal grandfather, of 
course, somewhat complicates Jones’s Oedipal algebra. Furthermore, just as we have 
generally found Palamedes filling the paternal role, so Autolycus assumes the paternal 
function of naming his grandson, Odysseus. Seemingly paradoxically, Odysseus 
vanquishes the embodiment of “device”—i.e., Dolon and Palamedes—through the doloi 
of Autolycan wiliness. So too does Odysseus adopt his grandfather’s wiliness in his later 
strategems which win the war. Nevertheless, Stanford repeatedly points out Odysseus’s 
“constant effort to avoid Autolycan odium,” which evokes an Oedipal struggle against 
the father, as opposed to the identification between grandfather and grandson (28). 
Arthur Miller’s Death of a Salesman provides an apt illustration of Odysseus’s 
predicament. “I joke too much!” cries Willy Loman, berating himself in self-loathing for 
his craftiness which he knows to be symptomatic of his own ineffectuality. By the second 
act, an agricultural corollary conveys the salesman’s existential anguish: 
WILLY, anxiously: Oh, I’d better hurry. I’ve got to get some seeds. . . . 
I’ve got to get some seeds, right away. Nothing’s planted. I don’t have a 
thing in the ground. (122) 
Like Odysseus, Loman finds himself at odds with Autolycan odium and an impotence 
symbolized in agricultural terms, as with the salt-sown fields at Ithaca. Again one finds 
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Odysseus’s struggle to resolve his interior duality—that is to embrace his Autolycan 
ingenuity without its attendant odium. By situating Palamedes—hitherto seen as the 
embodiment of this ingenuity in its negative, guilt-laden aspect—within Odysseus as part 
of his psyche, we may now progress to this study’s inevitable next stage, in which we 
subtract Palamedes from the narrative altogether. 
 
Odysseus Minus Palamedes 
 Consider the events, beginning at Ithaca, without Palamedes. Palamedes summons 
Odysseus to Troy; however, the summoning itself is in essence only the invocation of the 
oath of Tyndareus, Odysseus’s idea. When Palamedes calls Odysseus’s bluff at Ithaca, he 
is simply reminding Odysseus of the duty which Odysseus himself, by the oath, created. 
Therefore, in a sense, Odysseus summons Odysseus to Troy. 
 Provisioning the troops amid plague and paucity of resources, Odysseus envisions 
his failure. Addled with doubt, with no prospect of success in sight, he could not have 
kept the prophecies of Tiresias far from his thoughts. Facing twenty years as an exile, 
facing death by the hand of his own son, Odysseus finds his ingenuity put to the test. He 
musters resources for his men, but still there is that version of himself whom he has 
imagined as failing to provide what is necessary to survive. If such a depiction appears 
fanciful, one need only recall the straits in which he has left his fields and family at 
Ithaca. The fear is that what had been a voluntary failure at home may become an 
involuntary one at Troy. 
As for that part of Odysseus which still yearns for hearth and home, would he not 
see this part of himself as a traitor to his own cause, a betrayer of his men and mission, 
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one who may as well have acted as a double agent with King Priam himself? This, too, is 
Palamedes. Thus the apparent and peculiar reversal occurs when Palamedes suggests that 
the fleet return home. This is Palamedes’s fatal misstep, precisely the sign of weakness 
which Odysseus needs to exploit. Their original roles at Ithaca are now reversed, and the 
advantage is Odysseus’s now as it had been Palamedes’s then. At this point, Odysseus 
knows that he has his alter ego on the ropes. He must out-Palamedes Palamedes. Only 
then can Odysseus overtake him. By out-inventing the Inventor, Odysseus usurps his 
power. Having confronted the full scope of his cleverness and its implications, Odysseus 
vanquishes his weakness. Palamedes is no more. 
Here one finds the relation of repetition compulsion to the “it was” of Friedrich 
Nietzsche’s Zarathustra, which goes as follows: 
The will cannot will backwards; and that he cannot break time and time’s 
covetousness, is the will’s loneliest melancholy. . . . That time does not 
run backwards, that is his wrath; “that which was” is the name of the stone 
he cannot move. . . . This, indeed this alone, is what revenge is: the will’s 
ill will against time and its “it was.” (251-52) 
So emerges a new understanding of Odysseus’s name and its meanings: “to will pain to,” 
“to be wroth against.” At Ithaca, Palamedes exposes Odysseus as a traitor for his wish for 
home. The repetition at Troy, roles reversed, circumvents the linear movement of time 
and manifests itself through the symmetry of revenge. 
 This story has multiple endings—rather, it has multiple versions of the same 
ending. The Cypria finds Odysseus, repulsed at his having resorted to fishing as a means 
of providing sustenance for his men, which is, as Phillips notes, “usually reckoned an 
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undignified way for Homeric warriors to get food” (270). Odysseus glimpses his 
reflection in the water and, recoiling from his image, he banishes that specter, this 
Palamedes, to the bottom once and for all. Told another way, Odysseus sees Palamedes’s 
face struggling beneath the water’s surface. The drowning complete, Odysseus then sees 
Palamedes’s’ face sink from view and, once the waters calm from the deed, Palamedes’s 
face is substituted by Odysseus’s own reflection. 
 At Dictys’s well, the last thing that Palamedes sees is either his own reflection in 
the water or the stones thrown down on him. The stones, as mentioned above, provide an 
etymological reflection insofar as pala may mean “stone.” It is as though his own name is 
being hurled upon him.20 Finally, to the extent that Palamedes is the corporealized ego-
ideal of Odysseus, he even sees his reflection in his double’s face when he is stoned by 
the Greek army for treason. These coincidences of literal and figurative reflections 
closely correspond to Jacques Lacan’s mirror stage—that defining experience of one’s 
own otherness—in which the subject is necessarily an infant. 
 
Silence, Exile, Cunning 
Lacan’s subject in the mirror stage is implicitly unable to speak, and there is 
something literally unspeakable about Palamedes’s tale. It is worth recalling that 
Philostratus depicts Odysseus’s ghost as silencing Homer on the subject of Palamedes; 
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 The same would apply to the drowning, had Odysseus used an oar as a weapon. One 
may also note this etymology’s coincidence with Nietzsche’s stone imagery above. 
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however, there is another layer to this theme of the tacit.21 In all of the classical literature 
on Palamedes, excepting a handful of surviving play fragments and a few lines in 
Philostratus’s Heroicus, he speaks not a single word. Moreover, these authors do not even 
attribute words to him indirectly. They speak of him only in terms of action. Dictys, for 
example, does not even dare to paraphrase Palamedes’s diplomatic speech before Priam 
at the war’s outset. It is a scene entirely of his own fabrication, yet synopsis is the most 
he will venture. He concludes the scene by stating that “Palamedes was making his points 
with marvelous eloquence, and there was a certain indescribable force in the moving tone 
of his speech,” apparently content to leave the content of the speech to his readers’ 
imaginations (6). 
Dana Ferrin Sutton, discussing one such play fragment, notes that one “obvious 
problem facing a playwright writing a Palamedes would be posed by the protagonist’s 
proverbial intelligence: how could such an intelligent man be caught so off guard by the 
wily Odysseus?” (116).22 Sutton thus suggests that putting words in such a wise man’s 
mouth would entail a kind of hubris. Stanford provides an alternative explanation of 
Palamedes’s silence: “Shakespeare is said to have remarked that he had been compelled 
to have Mercutio killed off in Romeo and Juliet because the strain of keeping so 
exuberant a character alive would have been too exhausting. So the original conceivers of 
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 Much of Fight Club, which I shall discuss shortly, is similarly predicated on silence. 
The first and second rules of fight club are that “you don’t talk about fight club” (50). 
22
 I should admit outright that my claim that Palamedes is Odysseus’s alter ego both 
solves and circumvents this problem. 
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the Troy legend may have found it necessary to eliminate one of the rival Wily Lads” 
(Ulysses Theme 84). There is, in either case, a peculiar irony in thus silencing the reputed 
inventor of a substantial portion of the alphabet. 
While teaching the soldiers the alphabet, Palamedes further establishes his 
paternal role as he shepherds each pupil, Odysseus included, into the Symbolic order. 
Only after Odysseus has run the gauntlet of the Imaginary phase of development, through 
his encounter with Palamedes as his specular double, can Odysseus properly enter the 
Symbolic realm of experience. “The condition of the passage from nature to culture,” 
Žižek writes, “is thus an uncanny inner split of nature itself into nature as balanced circuit 
regulated by instincts and nature as ‘unruliness’ that has to be tamed by law.” This “split” 
is precisely what occurs within Odysseus, prompting Palamedes’s appearance. Žižek goes 
on to state that “[t]he ultimate ‘vanishing mediator’ between nature and culture is the 
death-drive as this derailed, denaturalized nature . . .” (They Know Not 206-07). We may 
now compare this concept to John T. Irwin’s remarks on the double, namely that “[t]he 
ego loves the double as a copy of itself, but it simultaneously hates and fears the double 
because it is a copy with a difference—the double is the ego tinged with its own death” 
(90). Put another way, the encounter with the ego-ideal as a specular other underscores 
one’s own alterity, one’s status qua object, and thus one’s own mortality. 
To complete the ego’s formation and enter the Symbolic order, Odysseus must 
differentiate the image from reality—the ego-ideal from the ego, Palamedes from 
himself. He must shatter the eikon, claim the reflection as himself; he must kill 
Palamedes. Palamedes’s function as vanishing mediator is therefore double. In one sense, 
as alluded to earlier via Žižek, Palamedes functions as the intermediary which enables the 
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Greeks’ transition from the warrior cult of natural barbarism to culture itself—that is, 
from the collective id to the formation of a cultural identity, an ego. In another sense, 
“Palamedes” is a kind of placeholder term between Odysseus the man and Odysseus the 
hero. 
Maynard Mack describes one phase of heroic development in which “the hero 
tends to become his own antithesis.” Mack claims that the tragic journey belongs to this 
phase, and the hero “will normally pass through a variety of mirroring situations. . . . 
Coriolanus, revolted from Rome and now its enemy, meets himself in Aufidius’s embrace 
in Antium. Hamlet meets himself in Fortinbras as the latter marches to Poland, but does 
not see the likeness—only the differences” (178-80). It is difficult to say which is 
Odysseus’s tragic journey. Perhaps it is his failed mission to Thrace, perhaps the one to 
Delos. In any case, the doubling of Hamlet and Fortinbras is especially apt. By the time 
Odysseus returns empty-handed to Troy, one can almost hear him thinking “O, from this 
time forth, / My thoughts be bloody or be nothing worth!” (Ham. 4.4.65-66). The voyage 
marks the end of Odysseus’s metamorphosis into himself. During the preceding time, 
beginning with the departure from Ithaca, Odysseus has become “his own antithesis.” 
And “Palamedes” becomes a kind of password, a shibboleth for “Odysseus.” 
 
Odysseus and the Horse 
 From the point following Palamedes’s murder, Odysseus is fully formed. No 
longer self-doubting, no longer seeking ways around the prophecy of twenty years away 
from home, he throws himself into the war effort. He embraces his exile. He has become 
the man of action, the Homeric hero. Having renounced his cleverness as an instrument 
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of his cowardice at Ithaca, he now reclaims that same cleverness as an instrument of his 
vengeance at Troy. Instead of a cleansing we have a dirtying of hands, so to speak, 
through a reversal—instead of a personal and divinely-willed catharsis, a situational, self-
willed peripeteia. After Odysseus’s partial castration—his actively rendering himself 
passive—he reasserts his priority to his double. His movement is from a passive—
etymologically, “suffering”—enduring of the centripetal forces of circumstance that got 
him into the war to an active creation, a centrifugal willing of the circumstances that will 
get him out of it—not by fleeing the war, but by winning it. He concocts brilliant 
schemes: the heist of the Palladium, the mustering of Philoctetes, and most significantly, 
the Wooden Horse. 
 Consider this piece of ingenuity. Odysseus, now out of Palamedes’s (which is to 
say, his own) shadow, does the unthinkable. He has his men pretend to return home. The 
very suggestion of such a thing would have been too tempting to Odysseus in his former, 
unrealized state. To convey the full range of implications here, I must briefly turn to 
Irwin’s remarks: 
Thus, in doubling, the ego takes the embodiment of its own death as its 
object of sexual desire, and the murder of the double becomes a suicidal 
liebestod, an annihilating union in which the sexual instinct and the death 
instinct (both of which seek to restore an earlier state) fuse in the ultimate 
regressive act—the suicidal return to the womb, the sexual reentry into 
Mother Death. . . . (90-91) 
There is a general tradition according to which one cannot kill one’s Doppelgänger 
without simultaneously killing oneself. One stabs him in the heart, only to look down to 
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find the blade in one’s own chest. However, after slaying Palamedes, Odysseus does not 
fall to the ground, battered by stones. Instead, he compels his men to repeat his original 
actions as part of the Wooden Horse stratagem. 
The Greeks burn their tents, a destruction of their temporary oikos akin to 
Odysseus’s salting the fields at his actual home in Ithaca. Under cover of night, they 
repair to Tenedos and await the lighting of the beacon, their signal to return to Troy (Aen. 
2.254-56).23 This detail is in a symmetrical relation to Dares’s account, in which 
Palamedes, originally detained by illness, meets the rest of the army at Tenedos (17-18). 
This detail also doubles the scene at Lycomedes’s court, where Odysseus had disguised 
himself and awaited the trumpet blast which would expose Achilles. Here the army, 
cloaked by darkness and the pretense of having fled, awaits the beacon on Achilles’s 
grave (Epit. 5.15-19). Odysseus has the army repeat their initial approach, but it is a 
repetition-in-difference. This deliberately symmetrical repetition constitutes revenge 
against their collective “it was”—namely, the failure of the entire mission to date. They 
approach Troy afresh and, most importantly, without Palamedes. 
Odysseus meanwhile enters the wooden womb of the horse which is symbolic of 
his death and, when he emerges from its belly, his rebirth.24 Knowing the outcome, one 
may easily overlook the Greeks’ vulnerability, as Stanford phrases it, “inside a wooden 
box, completely at the mercy of their foes if they should be discovered too soon” (85). 
                                                 
23
 The beacon is among Palamedes’s many purported inventions. 
24
 Virgil repeatedly refers to the horse by variants of uterus (Aen. 2.20; 2.38; 2.58; 2.243; 
2.258). 
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Stanford rightly brings attention to the fact that the Wooden Horse is itself a kind of 
glorified coffin. In this respect, one may note the correspondence with the uterine 
features of the well and the sea—two scenes of Palamedes’s death. The theme of reentry 
is itself repeated and heightened when, after Sinon’s convincing speech, the Trojans 
permit the horse within the city’s walls. One would like to think that the horse had been 
wrought from the oars of the Greeks’ ships, but that, perhaps, would be too perfect a 
correspondence. So too may it be worth noting one final derivation of Palamedes’s 
name—“hand-measure”—that is, by linguistic coincidence, as one measures a horse. 
 
Sinon to Trojans: Please Don’t Throw Me in the Briarpatch! 
The scene with Sinon entails a performative repetition of Palamedes’s fate. Just as 
Odysseus has dictated Priam’s letter to the Phrygian prisoner, so does he author the 
figurative script of Sinon’s reenactment. He then has Sinon pretend to bear false witness 
against Odysseus and company, to pretend to act as a double agent for the Trojans. Not 
only does Sinon play the role of Palamedes, he refers to Palamedes outright. In fact, 
Palamedes functions as both Sinon’s point of departure and primary point of reference. 
“If it chance that speech to your ears has brought some rumour of Palamedes,” Sinon 
coyly begins, even adding the insidious parenthesis, “not unknown is the tale” (Aen. 2.81-
91). By invoking Palamedes and his fate at Odysseus’s hands, he convinces the Trojans 
that he feared for his life in Odysseus’s company. He then adds, perhaps for symmetry’s 
sake, a rhetorical flourish—that he was to be sacrificed so that the Greeks could leave 
Troy, just as they had sacrificed Iphigenia in order to get there. Sinon refers to the false 
witness borne against Palamedes in order to lend credibility to the false witness he is 
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bearing among the Trojans at that very moment. In fact, one could argue that the tale of 
Palamedes, albeit perhaps as a decoy, originates in precisely this moment of Sinon’s 
speech. 
It is easy to forget just how precarious the situation is as Sinon denounces 
Odysseus’s actions to the Trojans. For all we know, depending on the acoustics and 
thickness of the wood, over the breath and thudding heartbeats of the men inside, 
Odysseus may well have been able to overhear Sinon’s every word from within the 
Wooden Horse. It is also difficult to account for whether Sinon would have been aware of 
his extended audience. 
 Only then do the Trojans bring the horse within their walls. Sinon is so 
convincing, not even the outrage of Laocoön and Cassandra can dissuade them. Having 
heard Sinon’s will to revenge the death of his friend, Palamedes, even under the constant 
threat of Odysseus, whom Sinon fears will take his life by similar means, the Trojans let 
their guard down. Sinon lights the ambush signal for the troops at Tenedos, Odysseus and 
company emerge from the horse, and, by the next day, Troy is in flames (Aen. 2.77-144). 
 
“I Wish I Had an Evil Twin”: Edward Hyde and Tyler Durden 
Having reviewed the Trojan expedition with Palamedes subtracted from it, we 
may now turn to a closer study of his Doppelgänger status. Robert Louis Stevenson’s 
Strange Case of Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde may provide a familiar example by which to 
understand the present case. Henry Jekyll’s alter ego, Edward Hyde, begins as a 
receptacle for the vices and sociopathic inclinations too intolerable for Jekyll’s 
conscience. Recalling the mirror’s initial reflection, Jekyll writes, “I saw for the first time 
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the appearance of Edward Hyde. . . . This, too, was myself” (51). Two factors complicate 
Jekyll’s “I” here. It either refers to Jekyll’s subjectivity as he recalls the event while 
writing the letter, or it alludes to some shred of Jekyll’s consciousness which observes 
Hyde while simultaneously being Hyde. This same complication arises in the line, 
“Henry Jekyll stood at times aghast before the acts of Edward Hyde,” in which it is 
unclear whether the shock occurs at the time of the act or only after he recalls it, having 
changed back to Jekyll (53). 
Eventually these metamorphoses begin to occur independently of the drug: “Yes, 
I had gone to bed Henry Jekyll, I had awakened Edward Hyde” (54). He soon feels 
compelled to choose between the two, noting that “Jekyll (who was composite) . . . had 
more than a father’s interest; Hyde had more than a son’s indifference.” The sense in 
which Jekyll is “composite” is of great importance, and the song, “I Wish I Had an Evil 
Twin” by The Magnetic Fields, usefully illustrates this point. 
Stephin Merritt sings of wishing for an “evil twin to do my will / to cull and 
conquer, cut and kill / just like I would / if I weren’t good.” The last lines’ irony lies in 
the fact that part of the speaker obviously is not “good.” Part of the speaker wants to 
perform these acts himself, which therefore makes him composite. The vicarious 
satisfaction is short-lived, however, as the speaker soon turns to violence: “he’d send the 
pretty ones to me / and they would think that I was he / I’d hurt them and I’d go scot 
free.” The first-person pronoun is crucial here. The twin now functions as a kind of 
wrangler and, ultimately, as a scapegoat: “I’d get no blame and feel no shame / ‘cause 
evil’s not my cup of tea.” He reassures himself that he is still “good,” seemingly 
oblivious to the reversal that has occurred. In appropriating the twin’s function, the 
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speaker thus becomes the twin. Merritt’s speaker relates to Jekyll insofar as neither could 
have distilled a purely evil precipitate were that evil not present in the original composite. 
As Hyde becomes the more exercised and developed part of the composite Jekyll, 
the latter marks a physical transition, “as though the body of Edward Hyde had grown in 
stature, as though (when I wore that form) I were conscious of a more generous tide of 
blood.” Jekyll suspects that “the balance of my nature might be permanently overthrown, 
the power of voluntary change be forfeited, and the character of Edward Hyde become 
irrevocably mine” (55). Jekyll’s prior sense of peaceful cohabitation now cedes to his 
acknowledgement of the split: “He, I say—I cannot say, I” (59). By the time he concludes 
his letter, on the verge of changing irrevocably into Hyde, he acquiesces, “God knows; I 
am careless”—which Katherine Linehan glosses as “indifferent”—“this is my true hour 
of death, and what is to follow concerns another than myself” (62). By claiming the 
“son’s indifference” which he had formerly attributed to Hyde, Jekyll thus confirms the 
paternal reversal which he had suspected, “that I was slowly losing hold of my original 
and better self, and becoming slowly incorporated with my second and worse” (55). He 
concludes his letter with the ominous implication that he will soon resume his double’s 
form and die as Hyde. 
Whereas Jekyll and Hyde share the same body, Palamedes appears to Odysseus in 
separate corporeal form. Chuck Palahniuk’s Fight Club therefore provides a closer and 
more current template.25 In the novel’s recognition scene, the unnamed protagonist 
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 David Fincher’s 1999 film adaptation complements the novel with some scenes absent 
from the latter, and I shall indicate which version I am discussing as the need arises. 
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confronts his love interest, Marla Singer, only to learn that he has been the other, the 
double, all along: “I ask Marla what my name is. . . . Marla says, ‘Tyler Durden’” (160). 
This name is a pseudonym, but the effect is the same insofar as he has considered Tyler 
Durden another person until this point. 
The protagonist—pseudonymously referred to as “Jack” in the film’s 
commentary—first encounters his double aboard an airplane. In this scene, absent from 
the novel, Tyler exposes various illusions of airplane safety, alludes to homemade 
explosives, and tells Jack, “You have a kind of sick desperation in your laugh.” 
Screenwriter Jim Uhls notes in his commentary that “until now Jack has the authority of 
the film because everything we experience is filtered through his commentary. . . . The 
other characters seem subordinate to him. So what actually needed to happen here was 
Tyler had to become superior to him as a character.” To establish this superiority, he has 
Jack compliment Tyler as “by far the most interesting single-serving friend I’ve ever 
met,” only to have Tyler dismiss his explanation of the term: “Oh, I get it. It’s very 
clever. How’s that working out for you? . . . Being clever.” “That was an attempt to 
transfer the power,” Uhls explains. Palahniuk, within the same commentary, observes 
how Tyler’s response “completely trivializes and mitigates everything that Jack does 
well. . . . It undermines Jack’s own value of his own cleverness. It’s been sort of thrown 
in his face.” This undermining of cleverness, one should note, is precisely how 
Palamedes asserts dominance over Odysseus in their initial meeting at Ithaca. The 
exchange which immediately follows between Jack and Tyler is also worth examining for 
its illustration of the characters’ power dynamic. Tyler rises from his seat, saying, “Now 
a question of etiquette as I pass. Do I give you the ass or the crotch?” Tyler gives Jack 
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“the ass,” thus providing him with the illusion that Jack is still in the dominant position. 
However, when he gives a nearby stewardess “the crotch” seconds later, he nonetheless 
displays his virility as a threat. 
Tyler Durden is a specular double, an imaginary friend of sorts, presumably 
brought on by the protagonist’s insomnia. As Andrew J. Webber notes, “the 
Doppelgänger is above all a figure of visual compulsion. . . . In the visual field the 
autoscopic, or self-seeing, subject beholds its other self as another, as visual object, or 
alternatively is beheld as object by its other self.” Webber therefore concludes that “the 
subject may not so much have as actually be the Doppelgänger by seeing itself. This 
visual double-bind provides the model for the general divisive objectification of the 
subject in the case of the Doppelgänger” (3). This phenomenological distinction provides 
one way of understanding Palahniuk’s doubling paradigm. “‘There isn’t a me and a you, 
anymore,” Tyler says, and he pinches the end of my nose. ‘I think you’ve figured that 
out.’” This patronizing, “got your nose” comedic bit contradictorily indicates two 
separate bodies, as Tyler immediately states, “We both use the same body, but at 
different times” (164). He further explains that, within this confrontation scene, the 
protagonist is dreaming. 
Sleeping and dreaming are central to the protagonist’s relation to his double. 
“When I fall asleep, I don’t really sleep,” he says (173). Tyler is more specific: “We’re 
not two separate men. Long story short, when you’re awake, you have the control, and 
you can call yourself anything you want, but the second you fall asleep, I take over, and 
you become Tyler Durden” (167). So far we have what appears to be a kind of 
sleepwalking scenario: “Tyler is a projection. He’s a disassociative personality disorder. 
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A psychogenic fugue state” (sic, 168). According to the above explanation, no sooner 
does the protagonist fall asleep than he awakens as Tyler Durden. In this respect, falling 
asleep would be equivalent to Hyde’s taking the drug. However, one should recall that 
the first case in which Jekyll involuntarily becomes Hyde also involves sleep: “I had gone 
to bed Henry Jekyll, I had awakened Edward Hyde.” Whereas Jekyll presumably means 
that he has slept for a time and awoken as Hyde, it appears in Fight Club that the 
protagonist, by the very act of falling asleep, awakens Tyler Durden. The metamorphosis 
appears to be immediate. Another difference is that the protagonist is unaware of being 
Tyler and still perceives him as a specular other. The trouble arises when Tyler tells the 
protagonist that he is dreaming. 
First, if one double awakens when the other falls asleep, and the two share the 
same body, then one arrives at the impossible case in which the body simply never 
sleeps. Second, if the narrator is dreaming, then he is asleep. If he is asleep, then he 
would presumably experience this exchange as Tyler. We must therefore expand the 
paradigm to account for a more fluid, reciprocal model. However, the labyrinthine 
logistics in Palahniuk’s novel are not necessarily crucial to its relation to Palamedes and 
Odysseus. The fundamental difference between Stevenson’s model and Palahniuk’s is 
that, some ambiguity notwithstanding, Jekyll never unequivocally sees Hyde as a figure 
physically separate from himself, whereas the protagonist firmly believes that Tyler is 
another person. 
Jekyll’s fear of becoming “incorporated” into his double is well put, for it 
expresses precisely this struggle of ownership over the body shared by the two 
consciousnesses. Fight Club’s protagonist gives voice to a similar fear: “Tyler Durden is 
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a separate personality I’ve created, and now he’s threatening to take over my real life” 
(173). Just as Jekyll notes Hyde’s gradual increase in physical stature, the protagonist 
acknowledges that “[e]very night that I go to bed earlier and earlier, Tyler will be in 
charge longer and longer” (174). The double is shedding its contingency. 
Hyde, though not Jekyll’s hallucination, is likewise brought on by an altered state 
of mind—chemically-induced, in this case. At this point, one should recall that Odysseus 
is feigning insanity the first time that he sees Palamedes. This point will likely raise some 
strenuous objections, namely that Odysseus is merely pretending, whereas Jekyll’s and 
the Fight Club protagonist’s altered states are authentic. However, Palamedes, who is 
merely Odysseus’s hallucinated projection, is the one who reveals Odysseus’s sanity. If 
Palamedes is not objectively present, then it is Odysseus who reminds himself of his 
sanity, an arguably impossible feat for a man who is actually insane. 
Although there is not enough evidence to argue conclusively that Odysseus 
experiences a kind of temporary insanity which spawns Palamedes, the following logic 
remains dubious. Odysseus pretends to be mad, but then a fellow whom he has never 
seen before appears and threatens his son, and he therefore stops. That the grandson of 
Autolycus was outwitted by a stranger should provide cause for suspicion. However, 
empiricism and objectivity cannot mitigate the epistemological paradox inherent in one’s 
evaluation of one’s own sanity. Compare this incident to Fight Club, in which the 
protagonist thinks that he is simply down on his luck with insomnia and good old-
fashioned ennui, but then this marvelous stranger appears and offers him a place to stay, 
so all is well. Whereas the scene at Ithaca is implausible because it entails the outwitting 
of the Greeks’ best wit, the scenario in Fight Club appears too good to be true and too 
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naïve of the jaded protagonist to accept at face value. Given these corollaries, it is 
difficult to ignore the possibility that Odysseus’s madness is genuine. 
The doubling between Palamedes and Odysseus therefore relies on neither sleep 
nor narcotics. The period simply begins when Odysseus “feigns” madness at Ithaca and 
ends with his murder of Palamedes. Odysseus, though not physically asleep, nonetheless 
lies figuratively dormant during this period. This is Odysseus between the salting at 
Ithaca and the slaying of Palamedes at Troy—Odysseus, possessing neither cleverness 
nor heroism, inert as the ships at Aulis, a ship without an oar. “One self does what the 
other self can’t,” Karl Miller writes. “One self is meek while the other is fierce. One self 
stays while the other runs away” (416). So Odysseus kills Palamedes not to vanquish the 
cleverness he embodies, but to reclaim it, to reincorporate it back into himself. Palamedes 
has indeed become superfluous—redundant, unnecessary to Odysseus. 
 
Who Made Whom? 
Jekyll’s anxiety that he will be “overthrown” by his double is shared explicitly by 
Fight Club’s protagonist and implicitly by Odysseus. To incorporate another famous 
example, consider what Edgar Allan Poe’s William Wilson says regarding his 
eponymous (and pseudonymous) double: 
Wilson’s rebellion was to me a source of the greatest embarrassment; the 
more so as, in spite of the bravado with which in public I made a point of 
treating him and his pretensions, I secretly felt that I feared him, and could 
not help thinking the equality which he maintained so easily with myself, 
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a proof of his true superiority; since not to be overcome cost me a 
perpetual struggle. (431-32) 
Thus there is a fear that the double, in revealing his superiority, will thereby claim 
paternal priority—that is, that the genuine article will become contingent, will become a 
copy of the double and, therefore, the double himself.26 One may well ask: Who is whose 
foil? Why is Odysseus any more than a footnote in the epic of Palamedes? Odysseus 
ensures the response to these questions with the same act which preempts them, by 
killing Palamedes. That history is written by the victors is a familiar saw, but it is 
nonetheless thus that Odysseus gains authority and control of the discourse whereby he 
will be remembered. 
 The question of priority has fatal consequences in another famous case of 
doubling—Romulus and Remus in the founding of Rome. “Since the brothers were 
twins,” Livy writes, “and respect for their age could not determine between them, it was 
agreed that the gods who had those places in their protection should choose by augury 
who should give the new city its name, who should govern it when built.” After Remus 
receives an augury of six vultures, twice as many appear to Romulus. “Thereupon each 
was saluted king by his followers, the one party laying claim to the honour from priority, 
the other from the number of birds. They then engaged in a battle of words and, angry 
taunts leading to bloodshed, Remus was struck down in the affray (1.6.4-1.7.2). We 
should not be surprised that when the question of priority reaches an impasse, it cedes to 
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 This fear of displacement is the same fear central to the debate on cloning, so prevalent 
in the mid-1990s. 
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one of posteriority—that is, which will survive the other. “Me first” becomes, by murder, 
“Me last.”27 
 The same reversal is at stake in the following exchange with Tyler Durden in 
Fight Club: 
Tyler is my hallucination. 
 . . . Tyler says[,] “Maybe you're my schizophrenic hallucination.” 
I was here first. 
Tyler says, “Yeah, yeah, yeah, well let's just see who's here last.” 
This isn't real. This is a dream, and I'll wake up. 
“Then wake up.” (168) 
Note particularly the absence of quotation marks where the protagonist is concerned. He 
is in dialogue with Tyler, yet his portion is narrated—that is, thought, not spoken. The 
protagonist’s half of the dialogue thus addresses the reader and Tyler simultaneously, 
subtly postulating the reader as the double. This point recalls the earlier, absurdist 
example in which, after being situated within the story by the reader, Palamedes is 
somehow aware of that reader as eavesdropper. 
This question of priority is inexorably involved with that of paternity. Palamedes 
is Odysseus’s alter ego, but he is also the paternal force overseeing Odysseus’s heroic 
apprenticeship. This role is already established at Ithaca, particularly in light of Irwin’s 
remarks on Odysseus’s figurative, partial castration. To see this double as the father in 
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 One should also note that the name of the slain double, Remus, coincidentally means 
“oar.” However, the implications of this coincidence fall outside the scope of my study. 
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the Oedipal triangle, one should also recall that it is Palamedes who first takes Odysseus 
from Ithaca, thus intervening between him and his wife, Penelope, and exposing her to 
the suitors’ advances. We may thus account for the apparent ambiguity concerning 
Odysseus and Palamedes, a reciprocity akin to Ernest Jones’s fantasy of the reversal of 
generations. However, this triangulation is never fully stable. The two men are never 
quite interchangeable, nor are sources clear as to which is the elder. Pausanias refers to 
Palamedes as the only Greek soldier depicted without a beard. This could be evidence of 
his youth, but it may just as easily be a result of the hygienic practices he introduced 
before the plague. 
These intimations of reciprocity are actualized in the medieval figure of 
Palomydes. Although his career contains strong parallels with Palamedes’s, as second-
best he appears more allied with Odysseus. All the while, Palomydes embodies the 
psychological dialectic of ambivalence between the two classical rivals. 
  
“Palomydes, Palomydes!” 
 Call it confirmation bias perhaps, but after spending enough time with doubling, I 
have found that doubles begin to appear seemingly everywhere. Before long one 
subconsciously becomes a self-appointed Noah, pairing off anything in sight. In some 
cases, however, the corollary is so obvious, so glaring as to alleviate any doubt of 
superfluity, and Sir Thomas Malory’s Palomydes presents precisely such a case. Insofar 
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as he functions both as Palamedes’s intertextual double and as Tristram’s double in the 
Morte Darthur, even the doubling here is doubled.28 
 Any discussion of the doubling between Sir Palomydes of Arthurian legend and 
Palamedes of the Trojan War requires immediate qualification.29 First, there is little 
evidence of any connection beyond a merely nominal coincidence. Second, each 
character inhabits an ill-defined, liminal space which is neither wholly mythological nor 
historical. Even when one accepts the premise of the Trojan War’s and King Arthur’s 
historical veracity, Palamedes and his medieval counterpart, Palomydes, still appear 
suspiciously out of place. Neither figure quite belongs in his respective narrative in the 
first place. Alongside an Agamemnon, Palamedes seems a phantom—even were he not 
Odysseus’s hallucination—just as Palomydes never achieves the same degree of 
historical authenticity as a Tristram. When Andrew J. Webber claims that “the 
Doppelgänger operates as a figure of displacement” and “characteristically appears out of 
place, in order to displace its host,” he is referring specifically to doubles within the same 
textual space. One must therefore expand Webber’s paradigm to account for a doubling 
which occurs across boundaries of textual transmission, history, and culture. “The 
Doppelgänger,” Webber continues, “is also temporally out of place, appearing at the 
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 Geoffrey Chaucer’s Palamon in The Knight’s Tale, who is based on Giovanni 
Boccaccio’s Palemone in the Teseida, functions as a middle term in this progression. 
However, I have restricted my remarks to Malory’s later representation of the figure. 
29
 Although spellings vary among critics, I have retained these two versions of the names 
for the sake of clarity and consistency. 
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wrong time” (4). So it is with Palomydes, who appears roughly two millennia after the 
Homeric period. Following a survey of Palomydes’s character and critical reception, I 
shall then trace a textual genealogy which may account for the unlikely appearance of 
this dubious classical figure’s namesake in King Arthur’s court. Finally, I shall resume 
the character study by linking the two characters through Freudian and Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory. 
 Sir Palomydes occupies a peculiar position in Arthurian legend. He is perhaps 
best known as Sir Tristram’s foil in Thomas Malory’s Le Morte Darthur. Throughout 
their rivalry, in love and combat, Tristram repeatedly bests him. “When he fails,” Bonnie 
Wheeler notes, “and he fails frequently, he turns in upon himself. He fills a crucial role in 
chivalric society, that of the runner-up or, perhaps more accurately, the almost-best” (68). 
Though hardly an outright failure, Palomydes nonetheless spends the majority of his 
career in his rival’s shadow. However, this inward turn, noted by Wheeler, provides 
Palomydes with a heightened subjectivity unique in Malory’s work. This superior degree 
of self-awareness is part of what makes Palomydes, in Kevin T. Grimm’s words, “so 
central to [the tale’s] thematic dialectic and so compelling to a modern, psychologically 
attuned aesthetic” (68-69). This singularity of character is primarily the result of his 
marginalization on cultural and religious grounds. 
 A Saracen, Palomydes is an outsider to the English chivalric world from the 
outset. “Few words,” Wheeler observes, “are as good as the unstable term ‘Saracen’ for 
meaning any strictly ‘Other.’” The location of Sarras is itself uncertain, “variously 
located by Arthurian writers—eleven miles from Jerusalem, or in Wales, or in Logres, or 
where the Saxons lived. . . . If Camelot is home,” Wheeler concludes, “Sarras is away” 
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(69-70). “Saracen” is therefore a protean signifier of alterity which Donald L. Hoffman 
traces back to the original schism between descendants of Sarah and those of Hagar (43). 
As such, it has suited the exigencies of religiously-motivated antagonism ever since. Its 
very vagueness has ensured its fluid adaptability from epoch to epoch, ever resisting 
identification with a specific other. Regardless of the term’s denotation in antiquity, 
Jacqueline De Weever claims that for medieval writers “the Saracens were defined by 
what they were not: not Latin, not English, not French, not Christian” (6). However, she 
is also quick to situate the term within the military and political context of the Crusades, 
arguing that Malory’s readers would have understood the term as designating “a non-
Christian enemy coming from a place outside the confines of Arthur’s empire” and “the 
implacable enemy of the Latin world” (7). Palomydes thus shares Palamedes’s vagueness 
of geographical origin, and both “appear out of place,” in the literal sense of Webber’s 
note on the Doppelgänger. 
Palomydes’s textual provenance is likewise dubious. Maureen Fries points out 
that Palamède was a newly introduced character in the French prose Tristan, one of 
Malory’s probable sources. In this version, the rivals’ roles are somewhat reversed, with 
Tristan initially cast as the jealous one, believing that Palamède has already won Isode’s 
favor (Fries 95). Malory’s seemingly playful relation to his source material further 
complicates this reversal. As Roberta Davidson notes, “Malory’s much-cited ‘Freynshe 
booke’ (singular) is itself a fiction,” and his references to its authority usually introduce 
details altogether absent from that source and of his own invention entirely (138). 
With his origins thus obscured, Palomydes provides Malory with a relatively 
blank slate onto which the author may project an outsider’s perspective on the narrative. 
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Palomydes voluntarily prolongs his status as an outsider when he vows to defer his 
baptism until after he has “done seven trewe bataylis for Jesus sake” (2.666). Wheeler 
notes this device’s creation of suspense over whether Palomydes will survive as many 
fights. “Theologically,” she elaborates, “the issue is strictly irrelevant, since Sir 
Palomydes is in effect already christened—not by water or by blood, but by desire” (71-
72). One must nonetheless be careful not to account for Palomydes’s deferral solely by 
authorial intention. Were Malory only concerned with creating suspense, why would he 
not have removed the very possibility of Palomydes’s baptism at this narrative juncture? 
The answer cannot simply be that Malory has a tale to tell and knows it will be altogether 
stillborn should Palomydes receive immediate baptism. More significantly, why would 
Malory make Palomydes the obstacle to his own goal of salvation, preemptively 
sabotaging and neutralizing the very suspense Malory means to build? 
One method of addressing these questions is by way of Palomydes’s triangular 
relationship with Tristram and Isode. Hoffman thus accounts for the peculiarity of 
Palomydes’s choice, despite its immediate context of the chivalric topos of vow-making. 
He claims that Palomydes “has decided that he must prove his worth to Christianity, just 
as the knight in a more traditional context fights to demonstrate his worth to his beloved.” 
Hoffman counts this choice among Palomydes’s “erroneous mistakes in interpretation” of 
his new culture (56). However, as we shall see, the psychology underlying Palomydes’s 
conflation of Christianity with Isode contains various other implications worth exploring. 
Whatever Palomydes’s motivation for deferring his christening, it is his 
subsequent combat regimen, specifically his rivalry with Tristram, which frames his 
character’s development. This rivalry shapes Palomydes’s experience in fundamental 
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ways, frequently placing his character on the brink of complete dependence on and 
subordination to Tristram’s. Olga Burakov Mongan assesses this rivalry as a triangulation 
in which Tristram mediates Palomydes’s desire for Isode (75). Palomydes’s pursuit of the 
unattainable Lady closely parallels his attitude toward baptism. During the very act of 
deferring his christening, Palomydes states, “I woll that ye all knowe that into this londe I 
cam to be crystynde, and in my harte I am crystynde, and crystynde woll I be” (2.666). It 
appears as though he views the actual sacrament as a mere formality, when in reality he is 
heightening its significance by creating the terms of its postponement. 
Slavoj Žižek’s Lacanian interpretation of courtly love provides a persuasive way 
of combining Palomydes’s stances toward baptism and Isode. Žižek argues that the 
knight must create the obstacles between himself and his beloved; however, he clarifies 
that the knight does not “set up additional conventional hindrances in order to heighten 
the value of the object,” as I stated above. Rather, these hindrances exist “precisely to 
create the illusion that without them, the object would be directly accessible [Žižek’s 
emphasis].” On the one hand, Palomydes claims already to be christened in his heart; on 
the other, his deferral of his actual christening betrays his anxiety that the sacrament itself 
will do nothing to change his outsider status. By conflating baptism with attainment of 
the beloved—in this case, Isode—one may substitute Palomydes’s impending christening 
with the unattainable “Lady-Thing,” which Žižek claims is “originally empty: she 
functions as a kind of ‘black hole’ around which the subject’s desire is structured” (94). 
He must therefore create a program of chivalric combat in order to postpone the empty 
sacrament which neither will nor can absolve him of his alterity within the chivalric 
milieu. 
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Once baptized, Palomydes disappears from the narrative in order to pursue yet 
another unattainable object. As Hoffman notes, he then “abandons the Quest for the 
Questing Beast, a mini-quest that seems little more than an allegory about the futility of 
questing. Thus he is no sooner assimilated into Camelot than he is erased . . . praised and 
neglected, Christian and forgotten” (58). Palomydes’s anxieties regarding the ritual 
therefore prove well-founded. Prior to these events, however, he sets about the duels 
which he believes will make him worthy of his christening. During this process he 
substitutes the love of Isode as his goal. 
Žižek identifies the courtly Lady with alterity itself. “This traumatic Otherness,” 
he claims, “is what Lacan designates by means of the Freudian term das Ding, the Thing . 
. . the hard kernel that resists symbolization.” One may therefore view Palomydes’s love 
of Isode as a projection of his otherness onto her, just as Žižek argues that the 
“idealization of the Lady, her elevation to a spiritual, ethereal Ideal . . . is a narcissistic 
projection whose function is to render her traumatic dimension invisible” (90). For 
Palomydes, it is not merely a matter of investing the love-object with a spiritual 
dimension. Rather, he substitutes Isode for Christianity to such a degree that one wonders 
whether even he knows for which he is fighting. Moreover, he knows and states openly 
that he will never have Isode, “the causer of my worshyp” (2.781), as he tellingly co-opts 
the religious term for amatory usage.30 
                                                 
30
 I would like to thank Dr. Scott Lightsey for calling my attention to the above phrase as 
a medieval commonplace. One should therefore be careful not to rely on its literal 
meaning as the sole evidence of the Lady’s apotheosis. 
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Regarding the triangular relationship with Tristram and Isode, Mongan notes that 
the homosocial bond is privileged above the heterosexual one insofar as “the real source 
of strength and of emotional support for men lies in the fellow feelings of other men, 
rather than in their relationships with women” (79). Grimm, by comparison, perceives 
Palomydes’s relation to Tristram in terms of a constant vacillation between love and 
envy. More precisely, he finds these two impulses simultaneously, as in the following 
scene in which jealous rage yields to tender admiration: “I wolde fyght with hym . . . and 
ease my harte uppon hym. And yet, to say the sothe, sir Trystram ys the jantyllyste 
knyght in thys worlde lyvynge” (2.529). Dorsey Armstrong notes a similar ambivalence 
in his postcolonial analysis of the Morte Darthur, claiming that Palomydes “both longs 
for and loathes the approval, recognition and acceptance of the colonizer. . . . [H]e wishes 
to be like Tristram, but desires simultaneously to destroy Tristram and what he represents 
because he knows he can never fully attain equal status with this knight of the Round 
Table” (“Postcolonial” 178). I find no contradiction among these three readings. The 
ambivalence noted by Armstrong and the vacillation between love and envy which 
Grimm observes both fit well within the homosocial bond which Mongan discusses. 
Grimm claims that the salient case of this coincidence of emotion occurs when 
Palomydes calls Tristram a traitor after having lost to him in a tournament (69). This 
grave accusation is unacceptable among knights, yet it is both necessary and essential to 
an ideology which mandates combative striving within the very fraternity it fosters. 
Andrew Lynch similarly notes that the “contradictory career of Palamides perfectly 
displays the conflict between the competitive basis of chivalry and its myth of 
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collectivity” (109). Palomydes, as the runner-up, is thus in a unique position to 
interrogate the institution of chivalry within which he is so precariously placed. 
It is in the scene at the well that Lynch locates Palomydes’s moment of subjective 
revelation. Here the knight encounters his own reflection, notes his faded appearance, and 
acknowledges his failure. He swears by the savior he has deferred, performing a double 
invocation of his own name which only underscores its hollowness: “‘Lorde Jesu, what 
may this meane?’ seyde sir Palomydes. And thus he seyde to hymselff: ‘A, Palomydes, 
Palomydes! Why arte thou thus defaded, and ever was wonte to be called one of the 
fayrest knyghtes of [the] worlde? Forsothe, I woll no more lyve this lyff, for I love that I 
may never gete nor recover’” (2.779). When Tristram arrives and accuses Palomydes of 
treason, adding insult to injury, Palomydes makes the same admission of defeat to his 
rival: “so had I nevir, nor never [am] lyke to have, and yet shall I love her to the 
uttermuste dayes of my lyff as well as ye” (2.781). Here and elsewhere Hoffman observes 
that Palomydes is “not quite ‘in’ on the rules” (51). However, Hoffman also argues that 
this exchange proves that Palomydes is “the only one to embrace the painful 
understanding of courtly love, the fact that fidelity is forever and is not compromised by 
opportunity or rejection. In this, he is far more a traditional courtly lover than his rival” 
(54). Thus Palomydes, precisely because he is the runner-up, is able to carry the project 
of courtly love to the absurd end of its logic. 
In this crucial moment, Lynch claims that the “accumulated weight of his history 
opens for Palamides a subject-position that outgrows the narrative function hitherto 
provided for him. Now that he, as a character, breaks free, Tristram is left behind. They 
exist, for the moment, on different planes . . .” (129). Hoffman likewise writes of 
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Palomydes’s collision with the chivalric ideology’s glass ceiling (56). The ideology can 
no longer contain him in his newly realized and heightened subjective mode. This point is 
what enables Hoffman to identify Palomydes as “both the apogee and the futile finale of 
the Christian imperative of medieval chivalry”—not because his christening poses a 
threat, but because his inclusion among the other knights suddenly seems superfluous and 
beneath him (57). Palomydes, perennial outsider, has so penetrated the chivalric ethos as 
to transcend it altogether. 
Palomydes’s implicit relation to Palamedes is beginning to emerge in terms of 
character. However, before explicitly outlining that correspondence in full detail, I must 
first trace the latter’s textual transmission through the medieval Troy narratives. Whereas 
Philostratus impugns Homer by implicating him in Palamedes’s deliberate exclusion 
from the narrative, Dictys and Dares discredit the poet by including elaborate, albeit 
wholly fabricated accounts of Palamedes’s exploits in their histories. Their shared claim 
to having witnessed the war firsthand, along with the anti-Homeric trend already in place, 
made their accounts the most trusted and followed sources for the medieval Troy story. 
Around AD 1160, Benoit de Sainte-Maure based his Roman de Troie upon the two 
authors’ works. “His main source was Dares,” Frazer notes, “but he also used Dictys, 
especially toward the end of his work where the former authority failed him” (3). There 
is, however, an exception to Frazer’s claim. 
According to Dictys, as noted earlier, Diomedes and Odysseus stone Palamedes to 
death in the well (2.15). In a slight variation of the versions told by Hyginus and 
Apollodorus, Dictys writes that Palamedes’s father, Nauplius, avenges his son’s death by 
lighting false beacons so that the returning Greeks would crash their ships against the 
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rocks. Oeax, Palamedes’s brother, meanwhile exacts his revenge by falsely reporting to 
Clytemnestra and Aegiale that their husbands, Agamemnon and Diomedes, are to return 
with women whom they prefer to their wives. This deception results in Aegiale’s barring 
Diomedes from entering the city and Clytemnestra’s collusion with Aegisthus, with 
whom she had already been committing adultery, in the murder of Agamemnon (6.1-2). 
Benoit’s Roman tells the same story about Nauplius’s and Oeax’s revenge. There 
is only one problem: he also follows Dares in making Paris Palamedes’s killer (18830-
35). To include both plot threads, Benoit conflates the two sources and forms a third story 
of his own. He still tells the story of Palamedes’s murder by Diomedes and Odysseus at 
the well; however, he frames it as a fiction told to Nauplius (27837-69). It is therefore 
with inadvertent irony that Benoit, in privileging Dares’s account over Dictys’s, presents 
the latter as a lie told within the former, when in fact he has merely created a new lie of 
his own. On the borrowed authority of two forgers, he manages in one fell swoop to 
discredit Apollodorus, Hyginus, and other more reputable sources who at least had the 
decency to provide a motive for inciting Nauplius’s revenge. Benoit, in contrast, provides 
no reason why the Greeks would have told Nauplius the fiction that his son was betrayed 
and executed instead of the truth that he died heroically in battle. 
Thus Benoit, like Philostratus’s Homer, becomes inadvertently complicit in 
bearing false witness. Nevertheless, his Roman—and, therefore, the accounts of Dictys 
and Dares on which he based it—gained currency across Western Europe and was 
ultimately responsible for most medieval Trojan War narratives. Perhaps its most notable 
adaptor was Guido delle Colonne, whose Historia Destructionis Troiae constitutes an 
abridged paraphrase of the Roman (Frazer 4). Guido’s work would then be translated—
  
66 
that is, in medieval terms, appropriated—by John Lydgate, Malory’s contemporary, in 
the Troy Book. Around the same time, John Gower likewise relates Nauplius’s revenge in 
his Confessio Amantis (3.973-1066). Even William Caxton’s Recuyell of the Historyes of 
Troye was but an English rendering of a French translation of Guido’s work (Frazer 5). 
Therefore the majority of Troy-related materials available to Malory would have 
indirectly stemmed from Dictys’s and Dares’s accounts. 
In The House of Fame, Geoffrey Chaucer envisions “the gret Omer [Homer]; / 
And with him Dares and Tytus [Dictys] / Before, . . .” (1466-68). This enjambed 
indication of priority subtly privileges the two falsifiers over Homer, providing but one 
medieval example of the latter’s fall from favor. In fact, E. Bagby Atwood points out that 
the Rawlinson Excidium Troie manuscript is “the only complete mediaeval account of the 
Trojan War completely independent of Dares and Dictys” (379). As Nathaniel E. Griffin 
notes, Perizonius definitively debunked the two forgeries in 1702; however, the European 
Troy tradition spent the intervening centuries “at the mercy of a lie” based almost solely 
upon these fraudulent reports (37-38). 
To complete the peculiar textual connection between Palomydes and Palamedes 
we must return to France—c. 1190, a few decades after Benoit’s work—to examine the 
prose Tristan. Renée L. Curtis persuasively argues that the Tristan was originally the 
work of Luce del Gast, who appears to have died while composing it (36). The work was 
then completed by Hélie de Borron, of whom almost nothing is known. Emmanuèle 
Baumgartner posits that Hélie more probably reworked Luce’s completed text, the latter 
of which is now lost (“The Prose” 325). Nevertheless, Curtis’s above view represents the 
consensus of Arthurian scholarship. The Tristan draws from various sources, such as the 
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works of Béroul and Thomas d’Angleterre; however, as H. R. Tedder and Michael 
Kerney attest, it was Hélie who first introduced the Saracen knight, Palamède (648). 
Tedder and Kerney relate what little is known of Hélie. He was presumably a 
relative of Robert de Borron, author of the Grail story, Joseph of Arimathea (c.1170-80), 
and his work was done “at the request of a king of England, alleged to have been Henry 
II or Henry III” (645). Suspicion arose concerning whether this enigmatic author had 
merely borrowed Robert’s surname in order to lend authority to his work—a practice 
which, one should note, would be much akin to the fraud perpetrated by Dictys and Dares 
a millennium beforehand. Referring to Hélie’s later Palamède, which contains both 
Meliadus and Guiron le Courtois, Eilert Löseth notes a trend in which “editors, 
embarrassed by the mention of the false Hélie de Borron by whom the Palamède was so 
artlessly interpolated at 355, thought to set everything right by making the name Hélie 
disappear and attributing the interpolated portion, as well as the rest, to Rusticien . . .” 
(435; my translation).31 Nevertheless, Patricia M. Gathercole notes the prevalent claim 
regarding Edward I—son of Henry III, for whom Hélie allegedly wrote—which may 
make editorial practices such as the one observed by Löseth irrelevant. 
This view holds that in 1270, during the Crusades and just prior to his coronation, 
Edward I was passing through Sicily with Hélie’s writings in tow. It was there that he 
met Rusticien and, like his father or grandfather before him, requested that he make a 
compilation—this time, of Hélie’s work (408). The resultant Roman de Roi Artus 
                                                 
31
 Rusticien de Pise (Rustichello da Pisa) would later meet Marco Polo in prison and 
become perhaps best known as the amanuensis for the latter’s autobiography. 
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includes the interpolation from Hélie’s Palamède to which Löseth refers. Therefore, if 
Rusticien’s work was based on Hélie’s, then attributing the latter’s work to the former 
author solves nothing. In fact, such an attempt at redirected deference merely constitutes 
a deferral to a fraudulent authority once-removed. 
The precise extent to which Malory incorporated Hélie’s work is not central to 
this investigation. Davidson likewise warns against an overemphasis of Malory’s work as 
translation, especially “when not only was he far from the first English writer to do so, 
but several of his sources were already in English” (138). What matters here is 
Palomydes and what could have prompted Hélie to insert him into Arthurian legend in 
the first place. Unfortunately, so little is known about this enigmatic author that it is 
impossible to say with any meaningful degree of certainty how one may account for the 
parallels between Palamedes and Palomydes. One may well argue that the coincidence is 
solely nominal—that is, perhaps Hélie simply liked the name and used it to add a veneer 
of antiquity to the character he was creating. To such objections I can provide no 
definitive refutation. Although the manuscripts’ historical evidence regarding Hélie’s 
work is hardly what one would wish, there are nonetheless enough coincidences shared 
by the two narratives to suggest a substantive connection. 
First, there is the matter of the well in both stories. Fountains abound in Hélie’s 
Tristan, and Baumgartner rightly notes their function as a kind of locus amoenus 
throughout the narrative (“La Parole” 195). However, fontaine may mean not only 
“fountain” but also “well.” The former is symbolically phallic, the latter feminine. The 
fontaine’s double register of meaning thus corresponds to the reciprocity of displaced 
desire between Tristram and Palomydes with regard to Isode and each other. 
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As previously noted, Isode functions as a stand-in or surrogate for Palomydes’s 
christening, which is itself less a religious event than a symbol of his acceptance and 
“worshyp” in chivalric society. Even the fontaine where Palomydes laments his lot serves 
as a secular parallel of the baptismal font which verges on parody. The ambitions of 
Hélie’s Tristan are similarly constructed. “Rather than Isolt as object of desire for which 
Mark is mediator,” Fries notes, “Tristan now has a new ambition—his longing for a seat 
at the Round Table, and a new mediator—its knights . . .” (93). So for Tristan, Palamède 
mediates his desire for Isode, while both merely cloak the fame which is his ultimate 
goal. In what seems a fit of displaced sexuality, Tristan defeats Palamède and wins Isode 
only to have an immediate affair with the wife of Palamède’s brother. Regarding the 
prose Tristan, Fries notes that “new mediation weakens the original motifs,” and the 
“ineffectiveness of old elements of the legend” may have caused Hélie to incorporate 
new characters such as Palamède (94-95). The well notwithstanding, there loom even 
deeper correspondences of which Hélie and Malory may not have even been aware—
especially insofar as, if they knew of Palamedes at all, it was only via the accounts of 
Dictys, Dares, and their adaptors.  
 There is an apparent inconsistency between the classical and medieval stories 
insofar as there is no woman in triangulation with Palamedes and Odysseus.32 Instead, as 
Fries notes with regard to Tristan and Palamède, the desire-object is a feminized 
renown—Fama, or Lady Fame—whose honor may only be had by one of the two rivals 
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 Although I argued earlier that Palamedes acts as an interloper between Odysseus and 
Penelope, there is hardly the explicit romantic triangulation as in the medieval tale. 
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(93). It is for fame—in the sense of posteriority as posterity—that Odysseus kills 
Palamedes, for fame that Philostratus’s apocryphal ghost of Odysseus forbids Homer’s 
reporting of the crime. Palomydes likewise makes his lament in terms of renown: “I may 
never wyn worship where sir Trystram ys, for ever where he ys and I be, there gete I no 
worshyp” (2.529). This concern belies an anxiety with social status and station but also 
with how one will be remembered by posterity. Philostratus raises the stakes drastically 
by making Odysseus’s reputation on earth responsible for the degree of his soul’s 
destruction by the Furies in the hereafter. 
Dhira Mahoney argues that the importance invested in objects associated with 
chivalric status signifies “that the primary motivation for action in the world of the Morte 
Darthur is the search for earthly glory, for ‘worshyp’ and a name.” However, she notes, 
“‘[w]orshyp’ is more than reputation; it is a man’s worth-ship, his self-worth, captured in 
his ‘name,’ or what is publicly known about him—the battles he has won, the knights he 
has defeated.” Although I have compared “worship” to the classical concept of Fama, 
Mahoney rightly points out its separate semantic register which, as the OED indicates, 
derives from the Old English weorð + -scipe (“Worship”). 
Mahoney counts horses and armor among these “trappings” and indicates that 
“[w]hen Palomides falls ‘oute of his wytt,’ the mark of his changed state is that he has put 
his horse out to pasture . . .” (111). She also notes several similar examples in which 
abandoning one’s horse signifies a certain discord or disavowal within the chivalric 
community. The above case of Palomydes clearly evokes the scene in which his classical 
counterpart first appears. Regardless of whether Odysseus is genuinely “oute of his wytt” 
or merely pretending, the yoking of two ill-matched animals and the desecration of the 
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field, in light of John Jones’s remarks on the semantic range of oikos, both parallel 
Mahoney’s claim. 
In the well scene, Palomydes becomes so distraught that “he gate his swerde in 
hys honde and made many straunge sygnes and tokyns, and so thorow the rageynge he 
threw hys swerde in that fountayne” (2.528). Here is a symbolic “renunciation of the 
phallus,” a throwing away of the phallic sword, akin to Odysseus’s scene at Ithaca. 
Similarly, Phillips notes that, in Philostratus’s Heroicus, Palamedes arrives at Troy “with 
neither followers nor a fleet as a proper Homeric chieftain should” (267). In Dares’s 
version, Palamedes arrives with a fleet of thirty ships, but he claims to have been delayed 
by illness (18). Given these examples, one could argue that each figure may strategically 
feign weakness in turn. It is worth noting that, despite the various instances in which 
Palamedes bests Odysseus, this initial incident at Ithaca is cited as Odysseus’s motive for 
murder in nearly all accounts. The irony is that, in exposing Odysseus’s strength, 
Palamedes actually weakens Odysseus by asserting dominance over him. Having seen 
through the inauthentic renunciation, Palamedes enacts the very psychological castration 
that Odysseus had feigned. 
In Malory’s depiction of Palomydes’s despair after his loss at a tournament, 
Armstrong notes the mimesis inherent in the “inability of Palomides to articulate what he 
is feeling, paired with the more striking inability of the narrator to describe exactly the 
gestures he makes.” Instead, Armstrong continues, Palomydes is “reduced to making 
bizarre gestures, unable to verbalize his anguished position.” He thus regresses to a kind 
of infantile state. Armstrong takes “Malory’s inability to find words to describe an 
experience each knight has” as indicative of Palomydes’s defining difference as a 
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Saracen (“The (Non-)” 31). However, Palomydes’s speechlessness also presents an acute 
case of Palamedes’s silence throughout the narrative in terms of Lacan’s mirror stage. 
Palomydes thus regresses to the infantile, Imaginary stage of development just 
prior to his revelation of subjectivity at the well, and he understands himself precisely by 
way of his otherness as seen in the image. However, instead of the usual experience of 
seeing the image of the unattainable ideal-ego, he encounters the ego-ideal, that point 
within the superego from which he perceives himself with repulsion. The elevated 
subjective position which Lynch attributes to Palomydes in this scene also entails a kind 
of death—specifically, of the knight’s former subjectivity. It is therefore no coincidence 
that this revelation coincides with the confrontation of his mortality. Palomydes 
immediately vows that he “woll no more lyve this lyff,” just as he tells Tristram shortly 
afterward, “I have as good wyll to dye as to lyve” (2.779-781). This despair quickly 
yields to aggression, in keeping with the psychological ambivalence previously discussed 
in terms of Grimm’s and Armstrong’s arguments. 
Mongan, as noted previously, explains Palomydes’s vacillation by way of the 
privileged homosocial bond among knights, and Irwin provides the logical extension. As 
also mentioned earlier, Irwin claims that “[t]he ego loves the double as a copy of itself, 
but it simultaneously hates and fears the double because it is a copy with a difference–the 
double is the ego tinged with its own death. Thus, in doubling, the ego takes the 
embodiment of its own death as its object of sexual desire, and the murder of the double 
becomes a suicidal liebestod. . . .” Now that the Lady-object and “worshyp” have 
revealed themselves as empty stand-ins for the Real, the subject’s desire seeks 
fulfillment, as Irwin states the matter, in “an annihilating union in which the sexual 
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instinct and the death instinct (both of which seek to restore an earlier state) fuse in the 
ultimate regressive act—the suicidal return to the womb, the sexual reentry into Mother 
Death . . .” (90-91). The otherness which Palomydes intuits in his own reflection must 
therefore be projected onto the other, Tristram, in the form of an ambivalent desire which 
embodies both the death drive and narcissistic love. 
In each version of Palamedes’s death, as noted earlier, one finds this same 
instance of the image’s reflection. Odysseus then enters the horse, in keeping with 
Irwin’s above remarks. He emerges reborn, wins the war, and sets about his long 
homeward wandering. Palomydes too wanders, seemingly vanishes in pursuit of the 
Questing Beast. Dante’s Ulysses (i.e., Odysseus), provides one final, extreme example of 
such a quest which is the subject of the following section. 
For now it will suffice to observe that, paradoxically, the most compelling 
correspondences between Palomydes and Palamedes are also the least historically 
probable. This improbability exists insofar as many of the correspondences concern 
elements of the classical story absent from Dictys’s and Dares’s accounts and therefore 
unlikely to have factored into Malory’s probable source materials—namely, the prose 
Tristan and Palamède. Nevertheless, the parallels remain compelling enough to suggest 
that, were more historical evidence available, one could definitively prove an even more 
consistent link than I have outlined here between the Trojan War hero and the Arthurian 
knight. 
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The Mad Flight 
 There remains one final version of Odysseus which merits a place in this 
discussion of doubling, one which strays drastically from nearly all other accounts. 
Dante’s Ulysses never returns to Ithaca. He and his crew make it as far as Circe’s island, 
at which point Ulysses persuades his men to abandon their homeward journey and 
venture instead to the farthest reaches possible. I shall discuss this ill-starred voyage 
momentarily. First, I want to discuss which sin of Ulysses’s is punished in the Inferno. 
 It is Virgil who explains to Dante that the twin flame contains Ulysses and 
Diomedes, and he accounts for their punishment as follows: 
And there, together in their flame, they grieve 
over the horse’s fraud that caused a breach— 
the gate that let Rome’s noble seed escape. 
 There they regret the guile [arte] that makes the dead 
Deïdamia still lament Achilles; 
and there, for the Palladium, they pay. (Inf. 26.58-63) 
The offense is therefore threefold: the horse, the mustering of Achilles, and the theft of 
the Palladium. We must now attempt to find the sin which unites these crimes. Scholars 
have traditionally classified this region of Dante’s Inferno as the “Bolgia of the 
Fraudulent (or Evil) Counselors.” However, Anna Hatcher argues that this designation is 
an egregious misnomer and points out that neither the horse nor the Palladium heist 
involves counseling of any kind (109-10). 
David Thompson provides a literal reading of the above final line: “Ulysses and 
Diomedes are paying the penalty for the Palladium. Period. A trivial detail, perhaps—
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unless we recall that some one else stole the Palladium” (sic). As Thompson indicates, 
Dictys and Dares claim that Antenor stole the Palladium, and in the medieval period 
these accounts had yet to be discredited. Guido delle Colonne, for example, retains the 
detail in his Historia destructionis Troiae, written in Dante’s lifetime. According to this 
reading, Ulysses’s counseling in the theft may only be inferred (150-51). Virgil attributes 
the theft to Ulysses as the “author of the crime [scelerumque inventor Ulixes]” (Aen. 
2.164).33 Thompson appears to presuppose that Dante would have privileged the accounts 
of Dictys and Dares, which certainly had currency at the time, over Virgil’s. If so, then 
the pilgrim would presumably choose not to correct his guide as a matter of courtesy. 
However, Giuseppe Mazzotta notes precisely such a correction just six cantos earlier 
concerning “a debate on the origin of the name of Mantua, a city founded, as Virgil now 
affirms, by Manto, daughter of the Theban Tiresias. This statement contradicts the one 
Virgil himself made in the Aeneid.” Mazzotta claims that Virgil thereby “places in 
question his own authority” (353). However, Dante’s reaction confirms the opposite: “O 
master, that which you have spoken / convinces me and so compels my trust / that others’ 
words would only be spent coals” (Inf. 20.100-02). This hardly sounds like someone who 
would privilege Dictys and Dares, regardless of their claim to temporal priority. In any 
case, the theft of the Palladium appears to have involved neither fraud nor counseling, 
and these other crimes are not going to discuss themselves. 
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 I would be remiss not to point out the application of inventor to Ulysses in light of the 
previous etymological discussion of Palamedes’s name. 
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 This leaves us with the incident with Achilles at Scyros, which, Hatcher argues, 
also fails to qualify as fraudulent counsel. She goes on to note that readers have been so 
invested in maintaining the paradigm that they have mistakenly applied fraudulent 
counseling to Ulysses’s final address to his men. However, she claims, insofar as Ulysses 
genuinely believes in the quest, this speech does not constitute such a sin, nor is it listed 
among his offenses. Hatcher then distinguishes between “the use of fraud in counseling” 
and “counseling the use of fraud” (111-13). James Truscott, who corroborates Hatcher’s 
above points, states that false counsel “means simply advice to use false promise, and 
nothing else” (61). This reading applies primarily to Guido da Montefeltro in the 
following canto. The fact that Guido occupies the same bolgia as Ulysses, Hatcher 
argues, has caused readers to apply the sin retroactively to Ulysses (111). However, if 
according to Dante’s schema the two must be punished for the same sin, then one must 
find a sin common not only to Ulysses’s three offenses, but to Guido’s case as well. 
 In explaining his tale to Virgil, Guido states that his “deeds were not / those of the 
lion but those of the fox.” Although Hatcher admits to leaving the task of identifying the 
precise sin to another, she finds a point of departure in the above image. “Guido is in Hell 
because he was a fox,” she posits. “And Ulysses is there for the same reason” (115). They 
are there for having perverted their God-given gifts of “exceptional sharpness of intellect 
and powers of invention.” Here one finds a point of connection with Palamedes as “the 
Inventor,” but it need not be belabored. I argued earlier that Palamedes functions as a 
missing link between the Greeks’ barbaric warrior culture and the intellectual culture 
later typified by Athens. Stanford echoes Guido’s animal imagery when he notes the 
latter culture’s burgeoning hostility toward Odysseus: “by the end of the fifth century the 
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Homeric lion was transformed into a machiavellian fox, and . . . this fox in turn had 
become the scapegoat of the Athenians” (sic, Ulysses Theme 101). Hatcher concludes that 
Ulysses and Guido share their punishment for “fraud (foxiness, trickiness) unspecified 
except as the abuse of extraordinary talent” (116). I concur with Hatcher’s analysis and 
wish to point out a few remaining semantic connections. 
“The wiles and secret ways,” Guido continues to Virgil, “I knew them all / and so 
employed their arts that my renown / had reached the very boundaries of earth” (Inf. 
27.74-78). These lines rhetorically tether Guido to Ulysses. The “guile [arte]” to which 
Virgil attributes Deidamia’s grief reappears as Guido’s deceptive “arts [arte].” On an 
intertextual level, Allen Mandelbaum’s translation of the Odyssey repeatedly applies 
Guido’s word, “wiles,” to Odysseus, as in the opening line: “Muse, tell me of the man of 
many wiles” (1.1). Mandelbaum’s use of “wiles” in his Inferno translation thus ties 
Guido to Odysseus’s Homeric incarnation. Finally, Guido’s reference to the “boundaries 
of the earth” recalls the Pillars of Hercules, which Ulysses describes as the “boundary 
stones / that men might heed and never reach beyond” (26.108-09). 
Although Ulysses’s voyage constitutes an act of hubris in the Inferno, Hans 
Blumenberg notes a modern appropriation in which the quest functions as an emblem of 
empowerment. “The self-consciousness of the modern age,” he claims, “found in the 
image of the Pillars of Hercules and their order, Nec plus ultra [No further], which 
Dante’s Ulysses still understood (and disregarded) as meaning ‘Man may not venture 
further here,’ the symbol of its new beginning and of its claim directed against what had 
been valid until then.” Blumenberg attributes this shift in meaning to a simple illustration. 
“On the title page of Bacon’s Instauratio magna [Great Renewal] of 1620,” he continues, 
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“Odysseus’s ship was seen to appear behind the Pillars of Hercules, interpreted by this 
self-confident motto: Multi pertransibunt et augebitur scientia [Many will pass through 
and knowledge will be increased]” (Legitimacy 340).34 Dante’s Ulysses thus enjoys an 
affiliation with the Promethean archetype previously held only by Palamedes. 
Whereas Prometheus and Palamedes became martyrs for humanity, Odysseus was 
considered the “scapegoat of the Athenians” in large part for his murder of Palamedes 
(Ulysses Theme 96). However, Blumenberg seems to argue that the illustration of 
Odysseus’s ship beyond the Pillars of Hercules fixes Odysseus in the company of these 
great benefactors of mankind. Odysseus’s defiance no longer constitutes hubris but a kind 
of heroic overreaching, the blazing of a trail for Bacon and all others whose “knowledge 
will be increased.” This magnanimous depiction sounds suspiciously less like Odysseus 
and more like his double, Palamedes. I am not necessarily insisting that Ulysses relapses 
into being his alter ego on his last adventure. However, this is but the first in a series of 
examples in which Palamedes seems to lurk within Dante’s textual presentation of 
Ulysses.35 Before addressing Palamedes’s implied textual presence in Inferno 26, I 
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 I would like to acknowledge Dr. David Adams for having introduced me to 
Blumenberg’s reading here (Colonial Odysseys 12). 
35
 One may recall, for example, the relation of Palamedes’s name to pila, “pillar,” as well 
as its connection to Hercules’s alias, Palaemon, whom Odysseus’s grandfather taught to 
wrestle. Although these correspondences are hardly conclusive, they nonetheless 
contribute semiotic evidence of Palamedes’s textual haunting of Odysseus’s death at sea. 
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should first address his absence—for which it is nearly as difficult to account—and to 
investigate his absence, we shall begin with Diomedes’s presence. 
Dante places Diomedes, Ulysses’s accomplice in two versions of Palamedes’s 
murder, in the same flame as Ulysses. Virgil provides the explanation that “Within that 
flame, Ulysses / and Diomedes suffer; they, who went / as one to rage, now share one 
punishment,” but this is as specific as the text gets (26.55-57). To describe any of their 
three listed crimes in terms of “rage [ira]” seems an odd choice. The original is as 
follows: “Là dentro si martira / Ulisse e Dïomede, e così insieme / a la vendetta vanno 
come a l’ira.” First, one should note the added Promethean resonance of “si martira.” 
Although Dante’s portrayal of Ulysses is hardly sympathetic, this connotation of 
martyrdom suggests a dignity which the text denies him elsewhere. Second, the simile’s 
construction is complicated by both objects’ reliance on the verb, “vanno.” Henry 
Longfellow’s translation is more literal: “and thus together / They unto vengeance run as 
unto wrath.” A clumsier version would be “they run unto vengeance as they ran unto 
wrath”—with “ran” in the imperfect tense, in the sense of “used to run”—yet Dante, in 
applying the present-tense “vanno” to both objects, semantically performs the ubiquity of 
the past in the infernal present.36 Whether one reads l’ira as “rage” or “wrath,” it 
certainly more befits murdering someone than suggesting the building of a horse, talking 
a boy into military service, or asking someone to steal a statue. If one refuses to accept 
                                                 
36
 As a rhetorical device, the simile also serves a mimetic function in terms of the 
contrapasso, the concept whereby the punishment enacts some form of the crime upon 
the perpetrator. 
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Hatcher’s argument against the “fraudulent counseling” paradigm, one should recall that 
every instance of Palamedes’s murder involves Odysseus’s lying. He falsely counsels 
Agamemnon to move the camp so that he can plant the gold, and he falsely counsels 
Palamedes to look for the treasure, whether in the water or the well. 
Why, then, does Virgil not mention Palamedes? One waits for it with baited 
breath in vain. How does murder not trump all of the offenses listed? One must be careful 
not to conflate Virgil with Dante on this point, remembering that the latter is responsible 
for the words we are reading. However, the Commedia’s allusive network makes it 
abundantly clear that Dante knew Virgil’s texts intimately. Insofar as Virgil’s Aeneid 
relates Palamedes’s story through the lying Sinon, it is possible that Dante assumed it to 
be another fiction. It would have been nonetheless possible for Virgil to believe it. By 
excluding Palamedes’s murder from Virgil’s list of Ulysses’s crimes, Dante implies by 
omission that Virgil thought the story false as well. However, Dante also clearly knew 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses, in which Ajax berates Ulysses for the murder of Palamedes, 
which makes Palamedes’s exclusion from the canto all the more puzzling. 
Whereas Tiresias had predicted for Odysseus a land so far inland that an oar 
would be unknown to its inhabitants, Dante’s Ulysses charges his men to gain 
“experience of that which lies beyond / the sun, and of the world that is unpeopled”—that 
is, to travel to the limits of the sea (Inf. 26.116-17). I do not want to force the corollary 
with Palamedes as a symbol of the sea, nor do I wish to press the relation of Spermo and 
Ithacan sterility to the following agricultural image: “Consider well the seed [semenza] 
that gave you birth: / you were not made to live your lives as brutes, / but to be followers 
of worth and knowledge” (118-20). The above connections are admittedly tenuous. We 
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may, however, note a stronger affiliation with one of the functions of Žižek’s vanishing 
mediator. 
Mazzotta claims that in the above speech “Ulysses casts himself as the rhetorician 
who fashions moral life: an Orpheus or a civilizing agent who assuages the beast within 
and sees life as an educational process” (350). I argued earlier that Palamedes functions 
as a “civilizing agent,” and Ulysses seems to be taking on a similar role in his address to 
his men. Prior to reiterating his speech, Ulysses expresses to Virgil his desire to 
experience “the vices and the worth of men” (99). This passing mention recalls the cases 
of Hyde and Durden, in which the Doppelgänger enables the vicarious gratification of 
vice. However, Ulysses wants to know the vices directly. Mazzotta is quick to point out 
that the quest is hardly ethical in nature (351). Rather, its object is, as Ulysses puts it in 
his address, “worth and knowledge.” This is a telling substitution. Ulysses’s private 
admission to Virgil—he appears unaware that the bard’s companion is taking copious 
mental notes—concerns “vices and worth,” while his public address to his men speaks of 
“worth and knowledge.” Mandelbaum has translated both valore and virtute as “worth”; 
therefore Dante’s structure is not entirely parallel. There is nonetheless the implied 
equation of “vice [vizi]” with “knowledge [canoscenza],” which, subtly—perhaps 
subconsciously on the speaker’s part—betrays a significant misunderstanding by Ulysses, 
like mistaking philosophical knowledge with the carnal, Biblical variety.37 
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 This point and the one which follows are really but gussied-up forms of the more 
familiar “street-smarts”/“book-smarts” binary. 
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“In effect,” Mazzotta states, “by having Ulysses equate virtue and knowledge . . . 
Dante retrieves the fundamental error of Socratic thought: the illusory belief that to know 
a virtue is tantamount to having that virtue. . . . Ulysses attempts to travel the distance 
that separates words from facts and to fill those words with reality” (351). One may 
therefore view Ulysses’s quest as an act of defiance against the Symbolic order as learned 
from Palamedes. “There is no necessary correspondence between res and signa,” 
Mazzotta continues, “between things and their signs, nor is the sign a receptacle of 
reality” (352). Ulysses appears to be attempting to empty the signifier of its power, to 
castrate the word. Of course, we may note along with David Adams that “Dante’s irony 
thoroughly undermines this attempt to contrast Greek seed, worth, and knowledge with 
brutishness, for immediately after reenacting this speech to his men, Ulysses informs 
Virgil and Dante of the brutal consequences of transgression” (27). As controller of the 
poem’s discourse, Dante “undermines” Ulysses just as Tyler Durden undermines Jack on 
the airplane in Fight Club, just as Palamedes undermines Odysseus at Ithaca and 
elsewhere. The deed, it seems, cannot overpower the word; it may only attempt to 
circumvent it, and Ulysses’s final voyage charts this doomed trajectory. 
 Ulysses’s men take the rhetorical bait, and he describes their voyage to Virgil: 
“we / made wings of our oars in a wild flight [de’ facemmo ali al folle volo]” (124-25). 
There are two things worth noting in this line. First, I believe that Mandelbaum has 
translated folle as “wild,” and not as the more literal “mad,” in order to mimic the 
original’s triple fricative alliteration (facemmo, folle, volo) with the alliteration of “we,” 
“wings,” and “wild.” To translate folle volo as “mad flight,” however, immediately 
recalls Odysseus’s madness at Ithaca, thus symmetrically bookending his life since the 
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war’s outbreak. Second, there are but four tercets between the end of Ulysses’s speech 
and the appearance of Mount Purgatory which portends his shipwreck (121-32). The first 
of these tercets simply relates his crew’s excitement. The last two contain strictly 
astronomical imagery. Of these twelve total lines, the dominant image involves the 
figurative metamorphosis of oars into wings. 
 This choice of image, as with nearly every word of the Commedia, strikes me as 
deliberate. That Dante did not read Homer is of no importance here, although that 
blindspot does arguably forestall one’s reading of this image as a parody of Tiresias’ 
prophecy regarding the oar in the Odyssey. Nevertheless, a close reader of Virgil and 
Ovid, Dante would certainly have been familiar with Palamedes. It is more difficult to 
prove unequivocally that he had in mind the Latin etymology of palame as “oar” in this 
passage. However, the choice still appears to contain at least a veiled allusion to 
Ulysses’s rival. 
 Finally, as the ship completes its final turn in the whirlpool, Ulysses states that 
“our prow plunged deep, as pleased an Other, / until the sea again closed—over us” (141-
42). This phrase, “com’ altrui piacque,” reappears when Dante and Virgil arrive at the 
base of Mount Purgatory, implying that Dante’s humility has succeeded where Ulysses’s 
hubris failed (Purg. 1.133). Two variants of this formula appear in Paradiso: “As pleased 
my guide [Come a lei piacque]” (Para. 22.22) and “as pleased Him [come i piacque]” 
(Para. 29.17). The latter instance’s English capitalization is appropriate insofar as 
Beatrice is clearly referring to God. However, the original spelling of “com’ altrui 
piacque” is identical in Inferno 26 and Purgatorio 1. Mandelbaum’s note—“[t]hat is, as 
God decreed”—clarifies that he is not suddenly adopting a Lacanian reading (382). 
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Reading the “Other” as God is certainly a valid choice, but the original Italian provides 
options which the translation perhaps precludes. For example, throughout this discussion 
we have come to know Palamedes as the very embodiment of alterity. Given the above 
textual clues, Palamedes therefore stands as a viable candidate as the referent for altrui.  
With regard to Tiresias’s prophecy of Odysseus and the oar, one should recall that 
he prescribed it as the means to assuage the wrath of Poseidon for the blinding of his son, 
Polyphemus the Cyclops. In the Heroicus, however, Philostratus discounts the Cyclops 
altogether, instead maintaining that “it was for Palamedes, who was his grandson, that 
Poseidon made the sea impossible for Odysseus to navigate . . .” (25.15). Rather than 
journey far enough inland to find men ignorant of oars, Dante’s Ulysses ventures out to 
the middle of an aquatic nowhere—Poseidon’s domain. Perhaps the sea god there exacts 
a grandfather’s revenge, one enjoyed vicariously by the specter of Palamedes close by. 
Such a reading, in which Ulysses’s murdered hallucination derives pleasure from its 
host’s demise, would suggest the final gratification of the death drive as seen throughout 
the Doppelgänger paradigm.  
To return to the remark from Borges with which this investigation began, we may 
say that Dante’s Ulysses is a “verbal texture” consisting of about twenty-nine tercets. 
Within that text, however, one finds a virtual palimpsest containing traces of Palamedes’s 
implied involvement in Ulysses’s sin. He appears inscribed in Ulysses’s story as much as 
in the words with which he tells it, suggesting that their fates are entwined even in death. 
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Conclusion 
 Most people only get one life, yet these thus merit many. We have seen Homer’s 
Odysseus without Palamedes, others’ Odysseus with Palamedes, and Odysseus again 
without Palamedes—that is, with Palamedes as a subjective, Imaginary presence, not an 
objective one. We have investigated a Trojan War hero who did not exist and how two 
second-century writers who also did not exist may have caused a twelfth-century writer 
who did not exist to include a man in King Arthur's court who did not exist but had the 
same name as the Trojan War hero. We have even seen Palamedes’s implied presence at 
the watery grave of his rival, at the very ends of the earth. 
 Whether Odysseus died by the hand of Telegonus as did Apollodorus’s, at sea 
beyond the Pillars of Hercules as did Dante’s, or at a restful old age in keeping with 
Tiresias’s prophecy, these ends depend on which tradition one believes. Yet one question 
remains, and one cannot help but wonder. When Odysseus did finally die, which face did 
the others find—his own, or the beardless face of Palamedes? 
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